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PREFACE
iii
Freedom of expression is an essential core of a well- functioning,
iree and open society. But, for practical reasons, the freedom of
speech and press cannot be given an absolute value in a society of mul-
tiple freedoms. Other values and societal interests inevitably conflict
with the freedom of expression. A malicious lie, for instance, not
misinforms the public? it may also seriously destroy an individual's
reputation. Or, publishing statements about a person's private life
may constitute an interference with his right to privacy, the right to
be left alone. Surely, too, there is a prime interest in the public's
awareness of governmental activity; but, publishing an unauthorized
disclosure of military secrets and governmental documents during wartime
might easily jeopardize national security. Thus, in a society which
values conflicting and competing interests, countless situations neces-
sarily arise in which the particular circumstances demand a curb on the
freedom of expression. Providing the freedom of speech and press with
an unbounded license to trample over other social values will not only
stifle the purpose of free expression, but will also endanger the health
of a free society.
Some societal interests have been given too much protection, at the
expense of free speech. In many states, for example, prior to 1 964
,
libel laws threatened the free flow of communication. The possibility
of juries awarding plaintiffs enormous financial awards for damages,
with only the defense of truth "in all its particulars" afforded to the
press, curtailed the freedom of speech by driving would-be critics into
accepting a form of self-censorship.
IV
In 1964, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court brought
state libel laws within the reach of the first amendment. Beginning
with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
, the Court has been engaged in a
process of rectifying the imbalance of interests established in many
states prior to 1964. The Court has devised a constitutional rule
which has continuously been rephrased and reformulated. And, since its
initial involvement, the Supreme Court has, in effect, rewritten state
libel law. At this point in the evolutionary process, however, it seems
that the Court will eventually imbalance libel law once again, this time
unfairly in favor of the value of free expression.
My thesis involves an analytical treatment of the New York Times case
the constitutional rule announced in that case
t
and the Court's elabora-
tion of that rule in subsequent cases. Chapter I focuses specifically
on the New York Times case. Since that was the first instance of the
Court's involvement, and because the rule announced in that case func-
tions as the foundation for the remainder of my thesis, I have devoted
an entire chapter to a discussion of that chapter. Chapter II traces
the Court's implementation of the Times doctrine in subsequent cases.
Since New York Times created more questions than it answered, Chapter II
centers the Court's attempt to answer these questions.
Finally, Chapter III presents an assessment of the Court's handling
of the delicate problems involved in trying to balance the first amend-
ment guarantee of free expression against the social interest in protect
ing reputations. Beginning with New York Times , freedom of the press
has been evolving toward a "preferred position," almost to the exclusion
of any protection for society's interest in safeguarding the repuations
Voi iuS members. The ultimate conclusion of this evolutionary process
will result in the almost total aboltion of the ability to protect in-
dividual reputations against defamatory publications. It appears that
the Court may eventually rule that the first amendment protection extends
to all defamatory statements except those involving the most private life
of the most private person. The exception, however, in my view, may
prove to be merely theoretical.
The study of the Court's work in reconciling the first amendment with
state libel laws has been almost totally ignored by the political science
profession. Therefore, for the most part, all my sources have been
written by lawyers and law professors.
I wish to thank Professor Dean Alfange, who not only offered a great
amount of his time and extensive and very helpful comments, but who also
introduced me to the study of the Supreme Court. My views about the
Court's work have matured primarily because of his continuous guidance.
For presenting alternative approaches to the study of the Court, and for
carefully and patiently helping me through the task of understanding
them, I wish to thank Professor Sheldon Goldman. And, I would like to
thank Professor Loren Beth, in whose seminars and informal discussions
I obtained many invaluable insights about the legal process.
Finally, I want to thank my wife, Patricia, for her enduring patience
while I prepared and wrote the thesis, and for her generous help in typ-
ing and proofreading the final product.
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1CHAPTER I
THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE
The Facts and the Problem
On March 29, ^960, the New York Times printed a full-page adver-
tisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices." 1 The gist of the ad-
vertisement was a charge that blacks in the South had been denied
their constitutional rights in their struggle to end racial discrim-
ination. Parts of the advertisement depicted alleged instances of
oppression against black students and their leaders. The two para-
graphs of the advertisement which were to become the basis of libel
litigation described the following:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My country,
'Tis of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders
were expelled from school, and truckloads of police
armed with shotguns and teargas ringed the Alabama State
College campus. When the entire student body protested
to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their
dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them
into submission [third paragraph].
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence.
They have bombed his home almost killing his wife and
child. They have assaulted his person. They have ar-
rested him seven times— for "speeding," "loitering," and
"perjury"—a felony under which they could imprison him
for ten years ... [sixth paragraph].^
L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner of the city of Montgomery with
power of supervision over the police department, although not named in
the advertisement, demanded that the Times issue a public written re-
traction. It is not unlikely that he was aware that under Alabama law,
a public official cannot recover punitive damages in a libel action con-
2cerning his official behavior unless he first demands a public retrac-
tion from the defendant who then refuses to comply. The New York Times
refused to retract its statements, responding to Sullivan's demand by
stating that "we ... are somewhat puzzled as to how you think the
statements in any way reflect on you," and that "you might, if you de-
sire, let us know in what respect you claim that the statements in the
advertisement reflect on you."^
Without answering the Times 's question, Commissioner Sullivan promptly
brough.t a libel suit for damages against the New York Times Company and
four Negro clergymen who had signed the advertisement. At the trial,
he claimed that the allegations of violence described in the advertise-
ment had falsely defamed him. The connection, according to Sullivan's
assertion, lay in the fact that the words "police," in the third, and
"they," in the sixth, paragraphs of the Times advertisement referred to
him, since he was Commissioner of Public Affairs, with responsibility
for supervising the police and other city departments in Montgomery.
This tenuous, if not imaginary, link between Sullivan and the advertise-
ment impressed the trial jury, and later the Supreme Court of Alabama,
as conclusive evidence that the alleged defamatory statements were made
"of and concerning" Sullivan.
Commissioner Sullivan did not attempt to prove special or actual pe-
cuniary damages directly resulting from the publication of the alleged
libel. To do this, he would have had to demonstrate that he suffered
actual financial loss from the publication of the advertisement, and
this would have required some doing. Of the 650,000 copies of the New
York Times circulated that day, only 39^ were distributed in Alabama
3and only 35 in all of Montgomery County. Moreover, as Harry Kalven has
noted, even assuming the statements in the advertisement did in fact
refer to Sullivan, "given the mood of the day, [they] would not be
considered defamatory by a southern audience."^
Nevertheless, the trial judge ruled that the statements were libelous
£er £e, and thus general damages were presumed. Under Alabama law,
since the alleged libel involved statements of fact rather than opinion
or comment, the defense of fair comment was not applicable.^ The only
defense then available to the New York Times was the task of proving
that the statements were true "in all their particulars."^ This, how-
ever, was impossible, for the defense conceded that certain statements
in the advertisement were not entirely accurate.
Of the discrepancies that existed, most were of such small consequence
that the United States Supreme Court's reiteration of them was perhaps
o
intended more as a satire than as a summary of the facts. For example,
the student protestors sang the National Anthem rather than "My Country,
'Tis of Thee." Moreover, not the entire student body, but most of it,
had protested the expulsion of certain other students, and their protest
was not demonstrated by refusal to register, but by boycotting classes.
The police, furthermore, did not ring the campus, but, instead, "were
Q
deployed near the campus in large numbers." Even more trivial was the
fact that Martin Luther King had been arrested four, not seven, times.
Of greater significance was the fact that the Montgomery police did not
padlock the dining hall, as the Times advertisement indicated. These
variations from the truth, however, supplied Sullivan with ample oppor-
tunity to bury the defense of truth "in all its particulars." Interp-
4reting the statements of the advertisement as falsely defaming Commis-
sioner Sullivan, the jury awarded him the enormous sum of 1i500,000.
The New York Times Company and four individual defendants, who had
signed their names to the advertisement, appealed to the Alabama Sup-
reme Court. However, the court sustained the trial court's rulings in
every respect. It further ruled that malice on the part of the Times
could have been inferred from the newspaper's "irresponsibility,"
which, the state court ruled, was reflected, among other things, by
the fact that the Times had in its files, at the time of publication,
articles which would have demonstrated the falsity of the printed
statements. The Alabama Supreme Court quickly dismissed any issue of
freedom of the press by stating that "[t]he First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications." 0
Thus, for printing an advertisement characterizing the racial antag-
onism prevailing in Alabama and other parts of the South, acting perhaps
negligently, but in good faith, the Hew York Times was assessed a- half
million dollars in civil libel damages. Moreover, by the time the case
was before the United States Supreme Court, eleven other libel suits by
local and state officials were pending against the Times seeking almost
$6,000, 000 in damages. The success of Sullivan's suit and the ease with
which he won his case inspired several other officials to take advantage
of a wealthy and "hostile" newspaper, which was made vulnerable under
Alabama law. If judgments such as these could not be overturned, the
New York Times and other newspapers that might be looked upon with dis-
favor in certain states, could be ruined by the hostile application of
state libel laws. As Professor Paul Freund has aptly noted, the problem
5before the Supreme Court was not whether to reverse, but how to reverse
1
1
the judgment against the New York Times
.
The New York Times advertisement was plainly a criticism of Alabama's
government in general; it was a public criticism of Alabama's response
to the civil rights movement in the South. Only a strained reading of
the advertisement could have led to an association of the contested
statements with any particular individual. No particular individuals
were attacked in the Times publication, and, therefore, the imposition
of punishment for this kind of criticism was, in effect, an invocation
of the doctrine of seditious libel, and thus clearly contrary to the
first amendment guarantees of free speech and press.
However, while, as Professor Kalven suggests, "Alabama somehow
pounced on this opportunity to punish the Times for its role in sup-
porting the civil rights movement in the South," it should also be
noted, as he did, "that the Alabama decision was not simply a sham,"
for "[i]t has long been noted that the law of defamation, with its
three 'galloping presumptions' of damage, falsity, and malice, can pro-
12duce sharply artificial results."
In the Times case, the most disturbing inequity was that, under Ala-
bama law truth "in all its particulars" was the only defense available
in cases involving statements of fact, and it was entirely possible to
forfeit this defense upon proof of even slight factual error. The de-
fendant could, in mitigation, seek to persuade the jury that the state-
ments, although erroneous, were made in good faith. But it was entirely
within the discretion of the jury whether to make this accommodation.
6The compelling nature of the case derives from the interests at
stake. Had the Court allowed the Alabama decision to stand, freedom
of the press would have been seriously abridged and, in certain parts
of the nation, virtually destroyed. The New York Times itself could
hardly have survived. Thus, to have sustained the Alabama Supreme
Court's decision would have been to allow the continued use of flexible
state libel law as a weapon with which to prevent legitimate criticism
of state governments by an unfriendly press. By allowing a public of-
ficial to treat an impersonal criticism of government as a personal
defamation, the Alabama courts were making seditious libel punishable
through the use of civil libel proceedings.
Furthermore, legitimate press criticism of specific public officials
would be made virtually impossible, for, if the official could point to
even the slightest, most insignificant error, he could win his case
against the press.
State libel laws have always reflected the conflict of interests be-
tween free speech and the protection of reputations. To protect the
interest in free expression, state laws have incorporated provisions for
13
"privileged," although defamatory, speech. Prior to New York Times
,
states had principally adopted two degrees of "privilege." That which
had been adopted by the larger number of states was called the "major-
14
ity" position, and the other the "minority" position.
At the time of the decision in New York Times , Alabama followed the
"majority" approach. Under this position, if the alleged defamation
of a public official was based on misstatement of fact, the only defense
open to the defendant was to prove truth "in all its particulars." The
7slightest deviation from truth could result in liability. This was the
apparent fate of the New York Times
. However, the "majority" position
allowed a defense of "fair comment" for statements of opinion rather
than fact. In order properly to invoke this defense, certain condi-
tions had to be met. First, the libelous matter had to relate to a
subject of public concern. Second, the challenged statements had to be
statements of comment or opinion; any erroneous defamatory statements
of fact were not protected. Third, the facts on which the comment was
based had to be accurate. Fourth, to be "fair," the comment had to be
reasonably inferable from the facts relating to the matter of public
concern. Finally, the "majority" privilege was not absolute; it de-
pended on the absence of malice, which was more or less vaguely de-
fined as "ill will," "negligence," or "evil motive." For example, if
it were claimed that a certain public official was poorly discharging
his official duties, the majority defense of fair comment might be in-
voked, provided that the comment was reasonably inferable from facts
and was not made maliciously. However, under the majority fair comment
position, if the critic had charged that the official was an alcoholic
or guilty of graft, he would have no defense but to prove the truth of
his assertion.
On the other hand, the "minority" position did not differentiate be-
tween fact and opinion in the establishment of the defense of privilege.
Under this rule, the critic of official conduct would not be assessed
damages if he could demonstrate that he did not make his charge with
malice, regardless of whether he made an erroneous statement of fact.
Thus the critic who charged that a certain official was an alcoholic or
8guilty of graft would not be held liable if his factual errors were
made without malice, defined as "ill will," "negligence," or "evil
motive."
Although the "majority" privilege of fair comment extended to all
cases involving issues of public interest, the "minority" rule (ex-
cept in a few states) extended the privilege for factual errors only
to criticism of public officials and candidates. The privilege for
statements of opinion or comment under the "minority" rule, however,
extended to all matters of public interest.
In a few states of the "minority" the privilege for factual error
was extended to matters of general public concern other than those
critical of public officials or candidates. In one particularly sig—
nificant state decision, Coleman v. MacLennan in 1908, the Kansas Su-
preme Court ruled that the privilege protected statements involving
matters of public concern, such as
the conduct of all corporate enterprises affected
with a public interest? transportation, banking,
insurance, and innumerable other subjects involv-
ing the public welfare. ^5
State libel law, then, as it existed at the time of New York Times
,
posed serious first amendment questions. First, under the law in a
majority of states, honest misstatements of fact were not protected,
even if the critic made the statements in good faith. The hollow de-
fense of truth "in all its particulars" was the only available defense
for the critic. Furthermore, even under the more liberal "minority"
rule, only a few states extended the protection for factual error be-
yond criticism of public officials and candidates.
9Second, even where state law granted a privilege, that privilege
was withdrawn in the event of a finding of malice—which was vari-
ously defined rather vaguely as "ill will,” "bad motive,” "negli-
gence,” or by other terms loosely connoting carelessness or malicious
intent. But standards of liability such as "ill will” and "bad motive”
are too uncertain adequately to safeguard the right to criticize gov-
ernment officials. In the day-to-day discussion of public affairs,
many critics of governmental activity will be motivated by the hope of
seeing a particular public official removed from office. However, that
"hope” can easily be interpreted by a jury as "ill will,” and under
such circumstances, the privilege may be forfeited.
It is, of course, true that the Supreme Court could have reversed the
state judgment in the New York Times case without reaching the funda-
16
mental constitutional issue. But a reversal on such grounds would
have left unanswered the underlying issue regarding freedom of speech.
The importance of the issue called for a new constitutional rule that
could uniformly and more equitably balance the conflicting interests
—
the protection of reputation and the protection of free expression.
The Court's Opinion and the Constitutional Doctrine
Prior to New York Times
,
the Court successfully avoided dealing
with the constitutionality of libel laws simply by denying that li-
belous speech fell within the scope of first amendment protections.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (19^+2), for example, the Court recog-
nized that there were
10
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes01 speech, the prevention and punishment of whichhave never been thought to raise any constitutionalproblem. These include the lewd and the obscene,tne profane, the libelous
. . . [S]uch utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to
rutn that any benefit that may be derived fromthem is clearly outweighed by the social interestin order and morality. 1 ?
Later, in Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), the Court repeated that
u lj ibelous utterances not being within the area of
constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary,
either lor us or for State courts, to consider theissue behind the phrase "clear and present danger."
Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech,
for example, may be punished only upon a showing of
such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in the
same class.
In New York Times*. however, the Court carefully and emphatically dis-
tinguished the earlier dicta. Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority
opinion, noted that "[n]one of the [previous] cases sustained the use of
libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of the official
conduct of public officials." The Court, he concluded, was "compelled
by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet
'libel' than [it had] to other 'mere labels' of state law," so that
states could not circumvent the principles of the amendment merely by
labeling certain expressions as "libel." As the Court emphatically
stated, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations. It must be measured by the standards that satisfy the
19
First Amendment."
But the New York Times case required no general rule on the consti-
tutional status of libel, for, while Sullivan alleged that he had been
11
libeled by the statements in the advertisement, there were no specific
references to him in the advertisement at all. It is doubtless true
that at least one statement was critical of the actions of the Montgom-
ery police, but could Alabama constitutionally treat as libel false but
impersonal attacks on governmental policy or its execution?
In setting the mood for its answer to this question, the Court re-
sorted to the infamous Sedition Act of 1798, "which," the Court pro-
claimed, "first crystallized a national awareness of the central mean-
ing of the First Amendment." The Sedition Act had provided for the
punishment, by fine and imprisonment, of anyone who criticized the gov-
ernment of the United States, even without specific reference to par-
ticular individuals. Although the act was never challenged before the
Supreme Court, Justice Brennan asserted that its unconstitutionality
has carried the day in the court of history."^ Quoting Jaimes Madison,
the Court confirmed "that the censorial power is in the people over the
Government, and not in the Government over the people." That no cri-
ticism of government could ever be proscribed was, therefore, the cen-
tral meaning of the first amendment. But, as applied, the Alabama
civil libel law permitted a public official successfully to claim enor-
mous damages because of an impersonal attack on his government's re-
sponse to the civil rights movement. Thus, the effect of the state
law was to punish seditious libel, and, moreover, to do so without the
safeguards of the criminal law, which would, presumably, have set limits
to the size of the "fine," and required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Professor Kalven suggests that the Court's opinion conveys the fol-
12
lowing syllogism:
xhe central meaning of the Amendment is that sedi-
tious libel cannot be made the subject of govern-
ment sanction. The Alabama rule on fair comment
is clearly akin to making seditious libel an of-
fense. The Alabama rule therefore violated the
central meaning of the Amendment. 23
This was the cornerstone of the Court's opinion.
The Supreme Court could have disposed of the Times case on this
ground alone. Yet, had it done so, it would have left totally unan-
swered the extremely important questions raised by the case regarding
the right to direct personal criticism at the official conduct of par-
ticular government officials. And, on this point as well, the Court
was prepared to dismantle more of state libel law in order to satisfy
the commands of the first amendment. As Professor Kalven explains, the
Court was "carried along by a momentum of insight about the democratic
.
. 24
necessities of free speech."
Alabama's civil libel law, the Court indicated, created a privilege
that was clearly insufficient to guarantee protection for the freedom
of expression. The state law compelled "the critic of official conduct
to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on
pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount
. . .
." As a
result, the press could be forced into self-censorship. "[W]ould-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criti-
cism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in
fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear
25
of the expense of having to do so."
The New York Times case, the Court acknowledged, must be seen "against
13
the backround of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unplea-
santly sharp attacks on government and public officials."20 But Ala-
bama's libel law effectively discouraged public criticism of official
behavior by not providing a safeguard sufficient to ensure the free-
dom of the press.
The Supreme Court, therefore, sought to establish a constitutional
rule regarding libel, in cases involving alleged defamation of public
officials, that would replace the narrow and imbalanced position held
by Alabama and the majority of the states, and that would permit and
encourage public dialogue.
In announcing its new constitutional doctrine, the Court held that
[t]he constitutional guarantees require ... a
federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct, unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"—that is, knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. ^7
This ruling thus incorporates into the first and fourteenth amend-
ments at least one aspect of the "minority" approach to civil libel
cases. That is, the distinction between fact and comment or opinion,
in cases involving alleged defamation of "public officials," is held
to be irrelevant. The "majority" privilege, such as that under Ala-
bama law, applied only to defamation arising from comment or opinion;
factual errors had no privilege. But on this point, in hew iork Times ,
the Court adopted the view previously described as the "minority" posi-
tion. In fact, arriving at the Times doctrine, the Court relied
heavily on the reasoning in Coleman v. MacLennan
. cited above.
Under the New York Time s rule, criticism of the official conduct of
public officials retains the protection of the first amendment, even
if false and defamatory, unless it is made with "actual malice," de-
fined by the Court as "knowing falsity" or "reckless disregard" of the
truth. "Malice" is not a concept unknown in the field of libel. The
privilege m both "majority" and "minority" states was conditional
upon the absence of malice, defined as "ill .will," "bad motive," and
sometimes as "negligence." However, the Court's definition of "actual
malice" has little to do with malice, as that word is defined in state
law. In fact, the constitutional standard of Hew York Times protects
malicious intent as long as the libeled person fails to prove that the
defamer actually knew the falsity of his statements or acted with reck-
less disregard of the truth. The defamer 's intentions are irrelevant,
unless, of course, they are helpful in ascertaining whether he deliber-
ately lied or acted with reckless disregard of the truth. As has been
noted:
No longer is [malice] a broad and obscure ques-
tion of a publisher's motivations—hatred, in-
tent to injure, negligence, lacking an honest
opinion, without good faith, terms used for flex-
ible definitions in the past. 2<^
ihe new constitutional standard of "actual malice" is a much more strict,
and less nebulous concept.
15
Alternative Approaches and Assessment
the Court's opinion in hew York Times was not unanimous. Three jus-
tices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg
—thought that the Court had not
gone far enough in extending constitutional protection to expression.
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, argued that the first amend-
ment provides an absolute privilege to criticize official behavior. "I
base my vote to reverse," he explained, "on the belief that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments not merely 'delimit' a State's power to award
damages to 'public officials against critics of their official con-
duct' but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power.
Black, of course, would extend his absolutist interpretation of the
first amendment guarantees beyond the narrow scope of criticism of pub-
lic officials. The first amendment, he insisted, protects all speech
with absolute impunity.
Justice Goldberg also concurred with the Court's result, but not its
opinion. Although not an absolutist in first amendment cases, Goldberg
insisted that the first amendment granted "an absolute, unconditional
privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow
30from excessive abuses." Goldberg would not, however, extend the ab-
solute privilege to defamatory statements aimed at the private affairs
of "public officials."
Both Justices Black and Goldberg criticized the Court's attaching
the condition of "actual malice" to the first amendment privilege to
criticize official behaviof. They attacked the "actual malice" stan-
dard as a flexible and amorphous concept in the hands of a jury, espec-
16
ially a hostile jury. "Malice," Justice Black complained, "even as
defined by this Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove
and hard to disprove." The conditional privilege, Black argued,
provides at best an evanescent protection for the
right critically to discuss public affairs and
certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safe-
guard embodied in the First Amendment.
Justice Goldberg also maintained that "[i]f individual citizens may be
held liable in damages for strong words, which a jury finds false and
maliciously motivated, there can be little doubt that public debate and
advocacy will be constrained."^2 "The right [to criticize]," he argued,
"should not depend upon a probing by the jury of the motivation of the
•
• 33
citizen or press." The Court's ruling, Goldberg charged, cannot
effectively safeguard freedom of expression because the standard of
"actual malice" allows "the imposition of liability upon a jury's eval-
34
uation of the speaker's state of mind."
There is considerable merit to the arguments of both Justices Black
and Goldberg. Given the facts and circumstances of the case, it is dif-
ficult not to agree with Black's conclusion that
[t]his record certainly does not indicate that any
different verdict would have been rendered here
whatever the Court had charged the jury about "mal-
ice," "truth," "good motives," and "justifiable
ends," or any other legal formulas which in theory
would protect the press. Nor does the record indi-
cate that any of these legalistic words would have
caused the courts below to set aside or reduce the
half-million dollar verdict in any amount. 35
The existence of hostile juries, or what has been described perhaps too
narrowly as the "southern jury problem," is quite real, as the facts of
the Times case dramatically attest. It is not overstating the political
reality to assert that unfriendly criticism may be viewed in parts of
17
the nation as "inherently" motivated by "malice," however legally de-
fined.
The Court majority, of course, recognized this problem. The Court
was keenly aware of the circumstances from which the Times case had
originated and the conditions possibly awaiting the New York Times
Company on remand in Alabama. Thus, after announcing the constitutional
rule, the Court made its own examination of the facts of the case to as-
sure that the Times doctrine would be properly applied on remand. In
doing so, however, it was confronted with the seventh amendment, which
states that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law." But, aware of the susceptibility of legal phrases to manipu-
lation and the situation in which the Times case had arisen, the Court
insisted that its "duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitu-
tional principles; [it] must also in proper cases review the evidence
to make certain that those principles have been constitutionally ap-
plied." Facts, the Court emphasized, are often intermingled with the
proper application of the law, and, therefore, the seventh amendment
"does not preclude us from determining whether governing rules of fed-
eral law have been properly applied to the facts.
Consequently, the Court reviewed the evidence and found for itself
that the statements in the Times advertisement did not refer to Sulli-
van and that the New York Times did not act with "actual malice," as
37defined by the Court. Thus, if Sullivan were to seek a new trial,
the Supreme Court, sitting, in effect, as jury, precluded the possi-
bility of a verdict for Sullivan.
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De novo review of the facts of cases has become a frequent aspect
of the Court's handling of libel. In almost every libel case which
has come before the Court since New York Times
, it has independently
examined the facts to determine for itself whether the criteria for
"actual malice" have been met. Some members of the Court have criti-
cized this procedure as an effort to constitutionalize the fact-finding
process, and have chided the Court for acting "as though it were a
jury ... in flat violation of the Seventh Amendment. 'Tljt is
almost impossible to conceive," Justice Harlan cautioned, "how this
Court might continue to function effectively were we to resolve afresh
the underlying factual disputes in all cases containing constitutional
39issues."
Nevertheless, the Court has continued the process of de novo review
of the facts of such cases in order to ensure that constitutional
principles are applied. And, indeed, the fact that the Court is will-
ing to review factual questions on appeal is, in the final analysis,
the only sure means of overcoming the problem of a hostile trial court
or jury.
Justice Black on the other hand has argued that the only sure method
is to make the constitutional protection absolute. Commenting on the
Court's solution to the problem presented by the facts in New York Times
,
Justice Black has said:
In my opinion the Federal Constitution has dealt
with this deadly danger to the press in the only
way possible without leaving the free press open
to destruction—by granting the press an absolute
immunity for criticism of the way public officials
do their public duty ... Stopgap measures like
those the Court adopts are in my judgment not
enough.
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But Black's solution, while giving complete license to those who
choose to propagate deliberate lies, would not necessarily solve the
proolem. Surely, in view of the history of civil rights litigation
in this country, it is no exaggeration to argue that a hostile court
can create some reason for ruling any constitutional doctrine inap-
42plicable in specific cases. Moreover, a person sued for damages
must respond in court, regardless of the degree of his constitutional
protection, and he must thereby incur the expense required for a legal
defense. Black's solution, therefore, is by no means a cure-all for
the problems of guaranteeing freedom of the press.
Justice Goldberg's solution also purports to solve the problems
which confronted the Court in New York Times
,
but, in practice, his
position creates many difficulties. First, for the same reasons that
Black's solution is no cure-all, Justice Goldberg's absolutism cannot
adequately deal with the problem of the hostile court and jury. The
opportunity for appellate review is still necessary.
Second, Goldberg would limit the application of his unconditional
privilege to cases involving criticism of the public activity of pub-
lic officials. "This is not to say," he explained, "that the Constitu-
tion protects defamatory statements directed against the private conduct
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of a public official or a private citizen." The fundamental diffi-
culty here, of course, is determining when public conduct ceases and
private conduct begins. Certainly some aspects of private behavior are
important for measuring the fitness for office of a public official.
Justice Goldberg conceded "that there will be a gray area. The diffi-
culties of applying a public-private standard are, however," he concludes,
20
"certainly of a different genre from those attending the differentiation
between a malicious and nonmalicious state of mind ."44 That distinction
seems facile. As will be shown in Chapter II, for purposes of the New
_—h 1 rule, private conduct and public conduct are not practically
distinguishable. In cases subsequent to New York Times
,
the Court has
forthrightly ruled that anything that might help in measuring fitness
for office is clearly germane to the "official conduct" concept of the
45Times doctrine. The "gray area" which Justice Goldberg acknowledges
has, in practice, become substantially larger than he perhaps antici-
pated. The distinction between private and public may be "of a dif-
ferent genre" from that between a malicious and nonmalicious state of
mind, but the practical distinction betv/een public and private is con-
siderably thinner than Justice Goldberg assumed.
Neither Black's nor Goldberg's approach adequately accommodates the
conflicting interests of freedom of the press and the protection of in-
dividual reputations. Not only are both positions unable to guarantee
freedom of the press, but both would create the danger of converting
that freedom into a license to publish untruths. Providing an absolute
privilege to criticize public officials, or, in Black's solution, an
absolute right to say anything, would encourage the dissemination of
untruth. It is true, of course, that responsible journalists and
broadcasters would not engage in perniciously false muckraking. But
some publishers might greet the absolute privilege with pleasure and
proceed to propagate scurrilous misinformation that could destroy
without reason the good names and careers of respectable citizens.
21
Abuse of the freedom of the press is, of course, a necessary con-
comitant of the maintenance of a free flow of communication. Some
falsehoods will inevitably result, and some must be shielded by the
j-irst amendment. Speaking of inevitable falsehoods and abuse of free
press, James Madison said:
Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with
which it is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which can-
not be stripped from the stalk without wounding vitally
the plant from which it is torn. However desirable
those measures might be which correct without enslav-
ing the press, they have never yet been devised in
America.4o
But it is one thing to allow the abuse and falsehood that is the in-
evitable result of uninhibited discussion; it is an altogether different
proposition to encourage deliberate lies. Justice Goldberg, of course,
agrees. However, he believes that a free press is too important in the
area of public discussion to condition its guarantee upon the failure
of a jury to find "actual malice," a requirement which would demand
probing the speaker's state of mind. Goldberg insisted on his uncon-
ditional privilege, "despite the harm which might flow from excesses
47
and abuses."
Nevertheless, the abuses which accompany an absolute license to say
anything should be unwelcome in a free society. A free press, of course,
is indispensable to the functioning of a free and democratic political
system. But to fulfill its function, the press must be responsible.
Encouraging calculated falsehoods encourages irresponsibility. As the
Court notes, "the use of the known lie ... is at once at odds with
the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in
22
which economic, social, or political change is to be effected."48 The
claim that abuses of the freedom of the press must be accepted if that
freedom is to survive, reflects a failure to consider other measures
which may more adequately deal with the interests involved.
The Court's solution in hew York Times offers a better balance of
interests, although the Times doctrine, also, fails to consider an im-
portant dimension of the problems inherent in the conflict between in-
dividual reputation and the freedom of expression.
Alfred H. Kelly has praised the New York Times opinion as, "quite
clearly
. . . one of the most libertarian affirmations of the Supreme
Court in the past several decades. Indeed, the Court's strengthening
of the freedom of the press in that case was received with virtually
unanimous applause from law journals. 50 As Thomas Emerson happily
notes, in i .ew York i imes
,
"the wall of separation betw'een libel and the
First Amendment [finally] came tumbling down."51
The standard of liability imposed by the Court in cases of criticism
of the official conduct of public officials—"knowing falsity" or "reck-
less disregard" for the truth—is much narrower than any previous state
standard. In theory, and even in practice, the Times standard amounts
to an absolute privilege responsibly to criticize official behavior.
Most newspapers and other media do not knowingly publish false state-
ments. Because of tradition, public pressure, expediency, or a sense
of honor and obligation, most journalists do not engage in conscious
lying in reporting and commenting on the news. Thus the Times standard
is "ideal for the newsman." It "entrenche[s] detractors of public
officials in their official capacities in positions virtually unassail-
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able by defamation actions." As an "almost impervious" constitutional
safeguard, the "actual malice" test provides the responsible press
with an unconditional privilege to criticize the official behavior of
puolic o^icials. In short, as John P. MacKensie writes, the New York
limes doctrine establishes reportorial standards "more generous and
permissive to the fourtn estate than the standards set by responsible
newspapers for themselves."
let, at the same time that the Court has given such broad protection
to the responsible press, it has not given constitutional immunity to
publishers who would deliberately lie. Thomas Qnerson, who argues for
absolutism in all free speech cases except where speech encroaches upon
the right to "privacy , has maintained that, if the deliberate lie is
denied constitutional protection because it would deceive the public,
"exactly the same could be said of negligent false statements which
56
the Court does protect."^ Indeed, good faith errors, which must be
tolerated to ensure the free flow of information, may be as effective
as deliberate lies in disseminating incorrect information. But the
fundamental and crucial distinction is that deliberate lies needlessly
injure individuals. Surely, deliberate lies can be avoided without a
serious threat to the survival of a free press. Currently, the press
does not enjoy an absolute, unconditional privilege to print anything
it chooses; however, I do not think that anyone would contend that the
press in this country is hovering on the brink of destruction. Further-
more, it would not seem unreasonable to insist that the press function
57
with a minimum of responsibility and care.
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Professor Ihnerson continues his argument by saying that "false
statements, whether intentional or not, perform a significant function
m a system of freedom of expression by forcing citizens to defend,
justify and rethink their positions ."58 Most people who are falsely
defamed may be able to "rethink their positions," but very few have
the power to "defend" and "justify" their positions because the
"marketplace" of ideas is a myth of the romantic era
.
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Not many in-
dividuals have ready access to the media. In fact, as I shall discuss
below, most "public officials" cannot secure the necessary channels to
rebut criticism made against them. Aside from this, however, I think
that "truth" is a healthier and less dangerous stimulant than false-
hood to the exercise of public debate. Only very indirectly does the
deliberate lie contribute to the effective flow of ideas; its direct
functions are to injure and misinform. The advantage of protecting
the conscious lie is outweighed by the potential harm which it may
60
cause.
All this, of course, is not to say that the "actual malice" standard
is necessarily the perfect solution to the problems involved in recon-
ciling freedom of expression with the protection of the reputations of
individuals. It is merely one attempt to provide a solution.
The most important shortcoming of the "actual malice" standard is
the difficulty of applying it to concrete cases. The problem is not so
much with the "knowing falsity" aspect of the test, but with the mean-
ing of "reckless disregard" for the truth. In New York Times , the
Court itself applied the test to the facts at hand and found that the
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newspaper did not act with "actual malice." But the application of the
test in that case does not reveal much about the meaning of "reckless
cisre ;ard. i ork i j.mes was an "easy" case;, the facts would not ap-
pear to support even a finding of "negligence" against the newspaper.
It is true that in its files the Times had reports contradicting some
of the statements contained in the advertisement, but the court ruled
that "mere presence of T the reports] in the files does not ... estab-
lish that the Times 'knew' the advertisement was false ."01 "Reckless
disregard," then, is something other than failure to conduct a thorough
investigation. Furthermore, those in the Times organization responsible
for publishing the advertisement, as far as could be ascertained, acted
in good faith and thought that the contents of the advertisement were
true.
In later cases, the Court has attempted more fully to clarify the
meaning of "reckless disregard," despite the fact that the term cannot
be rigorously defined. In the most recent case in which the Court
has discussed the meaning of the phrase, it was conceded that
"[ilnevitably its outer limits [must] be marked out through case-by-case
adjudication . . . ."
However, the mere fact that a legal standard may not prove capable
of mechanical application in practice is not enough reason to abandon
it and substitute in its place, as do Justices Black and Goldberg, no
standard at all. The entire structure of law is comprised of standards
and formulas which ordinary mortals must implement. There is no guar-
antee, of course, that any standard will be properly applied in all
cases—no formula, for example, would have prevented a hostile trial
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court and jury from "punishing" the Times
. But, as has been argued
earlier, not even Black's absolute privilege could eliminate that
problem.
In s\im, the lev/ York Times rule undoubtedly enhanced freedom of ex-
pression by providing the press with an absolute right to criticize
government in general and an absolute privilege responsibly to criticize
the official behavior of public officials. Prior to New York Times
,
state
libel laws had added too much to libel at the expense of a free press,
and, as Justice Brennan stated, quoting from the famous libel case of
Sweeney v. Patterson
, "Cw]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken
64from the field of free debate."
65But the converse is also true. Whatever is added to freedom of the
press is taken from the protection afforded to reputations. Thus, in
balancing terminology, how substantial is the loss of protection for
reputations which results from the increase in the freedom of the press
established in New York Times? Has this increase been gained at too
great a sacrifice?
In answering this question, several points should be considered.
First, the Times doctrine totally ignores the wide range of positions
that might fall within the term "public official." (This criticism,
of course, pertains also to Justice Goldberg's solution to the problem.)
In theory, the privilege to criticize public officials may be made
broad because the public official is not left "without defenses against
unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements ... The public
official certainly has equal if not greater access than most private
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citizens to the media of communications."" 0 This is no doubt generally
true, but there is a wide gap between the capacity of a United States
Senator, for example, to respond and the capacity of some obscure, un-
known, low-level bureaucrat. Access to the media is not an automatic
tringe benefit for all those who are called "public officials."
ihe inomas magleton—Jack Anderson affair in the 1972 presidential
campaign provides an excellent example of a public official with in-
stant access to the media, -but not all officials are vice-presidential
candidates constantly in the public eye. The New York Times rule would
have applied equitably had litigation arisen from this controversy.
However, that same rule might apply unequitably in the case of an anony-
mous bureaucrat who is falsely defamed and without a meaningful means
of response.
My criticism anticipates, of course, that a low-level bureaucrat
would fall under the "public official" designation. The Court, in
New York Times
,
avoided defining the full scope of that concept. But,
taking the words directly, a public official is anyone who holds a pub-
lic office. Yet, even within this range, there is an enormous variation
both in the kinds of offices and the power of response available to
those who fill those offices. In short, the Times doctrine indiscrim-
inately provides the same amount of protection to persons criticizing
any public official without considering the capacity of the defamed
official adequately to respond.
Furthermore, the distinction between public and private conduct has
proved in practice to be impossible to locate. ^ Thus if a critic
claims that a low-level official is a sexual pervert, there is nothing
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Hie _cj£ r cr.'. l imes rule that would make it inapplicable, particularly
sii.ce it may oe argued that the question of his perversion is relevant
u0 ohe issue o ; his fitness for office. Unless the official has the
means successfully to counter this attack, which is unlikely, he may
suffer unjust harm, while those hearing only the defamation are left
misinformed.
I think an entirely different situation arises if that same attack
were erroneously made against the President of the United States. He
has the means and public prestige, not only to repudiate the defamation,
but also to make a fool of his critic. But the New York Times doctrine,
at least by its own terms, would apply equally to both cases—resulting,
it would appear, in equally unfair results.
In terms of the interests involved, no better remedy exists than that
the defamed should have the right of reply immediately to respond with
countercriticism refuting the defamatory statements made against him.
The payment of damages, by itself, is no substitute for the real in-
jury caused by defamation. Of course, there may be some defamed per-
sons who would rather have the financial damages than have their repu-
tations restored. Furthermore, damage actions usually require many
months of litigation. By that time, most of those hearing the charges
have lost interest in the matter, although not the memory of the de-
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famatory statements. As many students of libel law have been urging
for years, the right of immediate reply ought to supplement the law of
libel . 69
In a very perceptive analysis of the freedom of expression, Jerome
/
A. Barron writes that
29
t]he irony of Times and its progeny lies in
the unexamined assumption that reducing news-
paper exposure to libel litigations will re-
move restraints on expression and lead to an
"informed society" .... Unless the Times
doctrine is deepened to require opportunities
for the. public figure [and private person] to
reply to a defamatory attack, the Times deci-
sion will merely serve to equip the press with
some new and rather heavy artillery which can
crush as well as stimulate debate. 7°
"What the Court has done," Barron argues, "is to magnify the power of
one of the participants in the communications process with apparently
no thought of imposing on newspapers concomitant responsibilities to
assure that the new protection will actually enlarge and protect op-
71portunities for expression."
Viewed from this perspective, the Court has elevated the freedom
of the press to criticize public officials, while those at the mercy
of the press have no means of rebuttal unless they are high-level
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officials with considerable access to the media. When the managers
of the communications industry exercise a substantial influence on what
can be expressed, the free speech guarantee becomes one-sided. That
guarantee, Barron concludes, must not only recognize a free speech
73
right, but must also provide for it, either by statute or by judi-
cial creation of a concomitant free speech right.
The right of reply should be made an integral part of the law of
libel. It is the most finely tuned instrument for bringing the in-
terests in reputation and free expression into a more harmonious
balance of interests. Equipped with the right of reply, the defamed
individual would have the opportunity immediately to counter defama-
tory allegations made against him. His channel of response would be
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the same specific channel which published the defamation. Thus, for
example, a person defamed by a local newspaper would be assured the
right immediately to reply through that same newspaper. The right
would require the publisher to provide the opportunity for rebuttal.
Surely, of course, this requirement would apply only to established
media of communications. For example, if an individual were defamed
by a person distributing mimeographed hand-bills, the right of reply
would not apply. The purpose of the right pertains more clearly to
established newspapers, magazines, and the broadcasting media.
To be sure, the right of reply will not remove the conflict, but
it would assure a better accommodation between two inherently conflict-
ing social interests. It is perhaps the only means of practically real-
izing the "marketplace” of ideas concept, if realization can be attained
at all. If the defamed public official, whether a low-level bureau-
crat or the President of the United States, can adequately respond in
defense, the application of the "actual malice" standard would result
in much less destruction of the social interest in protecting reputations
than would the Court's balance in New York Times .
The difficulty with the right of reply lies in its promulgation and
implementation. Some states, by statute, already provide a right of re-
ply. But there is no obstacle in the way of reading into the first
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amendment, the right to reply to defamatory criticism. After all,
the first amendment says nothing about "actual malice;" that standard
is a judicial artifact, designed to balance interests. A better bal-
ance, however, would be to rule that the first amendment provides pub-
lic officials, unjustly defamed, with the right to respond in defense.
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Granting a right oi reply to all public officials would not mean
that critics would thereafter be free deliberately and falsely to at-
tack public officials with impunity, provided the officials have open
channels to counter the attack. That situation would, again, encourage
the untruth from irresponsible critics seeking to injure and generate
falsehoods. Therefore, I would make the right of reply only a first
step in the process of vindicating the reputations of the defamed. In
other words, if the defamed public official believes that he was inten-
tionally and falsely defamed, he can take his case to court. And, if
it can be proven that the publisher of the defamation acted with
"actual malice," as defined by the Court, then damages can be awarded.
Thus, the right of reply would only be a supplement to the law; it
would not be a final, all-embracing solution. The "actual malice" •
standard must be made part of the law to deter the irresponsible func-
tioning of the press. Nevertheless, the supplement of the right of re-
ply would better accommodate the conflict of interests than would the
Court's sweeping doctrine announced in New York Times
.
Rather than the first amendment, a more practical ground for the
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right of reply should come from a statute, either state or federal.
But, if only a handful of states are willing through statutes to pro-
vide this right, and Congress does not enact a federal statute, the
Court should insist that free speech can be meaningful only when all
participants in the communications process have at least a minimal re-
sponse capability, especially when they are defamed. As the Court can
create the "actual malice" standard, it can as ‘well create the right of
reply as a prerequisite to the initiation of a libel suite. In other
32
words, when a person is defamed, it would become incumbent upon the
Oi ohe defamation to allow the defamed to respond.
Implement ition of the right of reply is not impractical. Many
European and Latin American countries provide that right without a
strain on the functioning of the communications industry. And, cur-
rently, there is a growing recognition of the need for and the possibil-
77lty of a right of reply. It is the only solution which focuses directly
on the central facet of the conflict of interests.
The utility of a right of reply does not benefit only the defamed.
It might prevent many libel cases from going to court, a process which
is not only time consuming, but very often quite expensive. In 1917,
in Henry Ford's famous libel suit against the Chi carp Tribune
,
the jury
79found in favor of Ford. But in view of the newspaper's good faith,
the amount awarded in damages was only six cents. Yet in defending it-
self against Ford the Chicago Tribune invested over $500,000, the amount
in damages awarded to Commissioner Sullivan by the Alabama courts against
the New York Times . Had an effective right of reply been available, the
Chicago Tribune might have avoided the enormous expense invested in its
defense.
Although Justice Brennan and the Court majority recognized the pro-
found need for uninhibited debate on "public issues," the Times rule
was specifically limited to criticism aimed at the official conduct
of public officials. The most important question following New York
Times was whether the Court would eventually extend the application of
its constitutional doctrine to other kinds of potentially libelous
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speecn that is, to speech involving important public matters, but not
involving the o^icial conduct of public officials.
.'n ting shortly after hew York Times, Willard H. Pedrick argued that
"the limitation .of the hew York Times doctrine to defamation of "public
officials"] is not compatible with the base on which the announced fed-
eral privilege rests-the first amendment.
"
c0
Surely, if debate on pub-
lic issues is to be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," as the Court
stated, then the privilege to criticize must be extended beyond the limi-
ted category established by the Court in its opinion in New York Times.
Pedrick predicted that "Ci]t is difficult to believe that the Court will
adhere to the announced limitation of the privilege .... The de-
termination of 'matters of public concern,'" he concluded, would per-
haps become "the key to the application of the privilege.
"
dl
As a
matter of fact, the Court has extended the constitutional protection far
beyond the boundaries of the rule announced in New York Times. And, as
Pedrick predicted, it appears as if the criterion for application of the
"actual malice" standard is evolving towards a determination of "matters
of public concern."
As to the specific rule in New York Times
,
many questions were left
unanswered in the Court'1 s opinion. Who, for example, is a "public of-
ficial?" How far down the ranks of public office-holders and other
governmental employees does the rule apply? When is conduct related to
official duty and when is it a purely private affair? These are ques-
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tions to which the Court offered no guidance. However, in a series
of cases since New York Times
,
it has made an effort to elaborate on its
constitutional doctrine, and has further revised the constitutional law
of libel.
POST-NEW YORK TIMES DEVELOPMENT: APPLICATION OF THE RULE
A constitutional rule or doctrine displays its full meaning only as
applied in practice. This chapter will focus on the Supreme Court's
implementation of the New York Times rule as it has been clarified and
reformulated in subsequent cases. Discussion will be confined almost
entirely to cases decided by the Court, although most of the reconstruc-
tion of the Times doctrine has originated in many lower federal and
state courts. Supplied with little guidance from the Court in New York
limes
,
the lower courts have been forced to initiate new approaches for
applying the Times doctrine to various circumstances.
This chapter has been divided into a number of sections, each focusing
on an aspect of the Times rule as originally constructed, and as supple-
mented and reconstructed through subsequent cases.
"Official Conduct"
Balancing the conflicting interests in New York Times
,
the Supreme
Court ruled that a public official's interest. in protecting his reputa-
tion outweighs the interest in public debate only in the area of his
purely private affairs or in the case of reckless disregard of the truth.
His interest in protecting his reputation as it relates to his official
conduct is, however, overborne, by the interest in public debate, as long
as public debate is responsible. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring
opinion in New York Times
,
claimed that "Ci]n most cases ... there
will be little difficulty in distinguishing defamatory speech relating
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to private conduct from that relating to official conduct." He rec-
ognized, of course, a "gray area" in which conduct of both overlap.
Clearly, criticism which is directed at the manner in which a public
Oificial discharges his official duties falls within the constitutional
protection created by New York Times
. Responsible criticism, for in-
stance, which castigates a governor's implementation of a particular
welfare program is surely protected by the Times ruling. But suppose,
for example, that it was reported falsely, but not deliberately, that an
important public officeholder who supervised the control of alcoholic
beverages had been arrested several times for drunk driving. Would such
a false and obviously defamatory publication be privileged under the rule
established in New York Times? No doubt it would be privileged because
whether the public official was a drunk driver is certainly relevant to
the performance of his duties concerning the governmental control of al-
coholic beverages. Although the alleged arrests would have been made
against the public official as a private person, they unquestionably
have a potential bearing on the position which the public official
holds in the government.
The private life of an official is very often related to his official
behavior. Private conduct frequently has an important impact upon the
official behavior of a public official. The honesty and integrity that
he exhibits in his private affairs is certainly germane to an assessment
of his integrity in office. In New York Times, the Court simply distin-
guished between official and private conduct witnout defining either.
The problem, however, is not simply one of distinguishing between public
and private conduct, since almost every private action has some potential
connection with official behavior. The problem is, rather, one of iso-
latmp pure-Ly private matters from private matters which have some rea-
sonable relevance to official behavior. However, similar to the problem
of obscenity, the categories are impossible to define except through a
case-by-case procedure. The Court acknowledged that a category of purely
private behavior exists, but is at a loss to define it. Perhaps the
Court has learned from its past attempts legally to define obscenity.
After ten years of fumbling with definitions the Court was depicted by
one critic as the "Tower of Babel." In New York Times
,
the Court re-
frained from defining official and private conduct. But, in later cases,
although continuing to avoid specific definitions, the Supreme Court
has tried to explain the meaning of "official conduct."
In Garrison v. Louisiana
,
decided eight months after New York Times
,
the Court made its first attempt to elaborate the meaning of "official
conduct."^ James Garrison, a district attorney in Louisiana, was con-
victed of violating the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute. At a
press conference he had accused several state court judges of ineffic-
iency, laziness, of taking excessive vacations, of hampering his own
efforts to enforce the vice laws in New Orleans, and of possible subjec-
tion to "racketeer influences." On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court
ruled that Garrison's statements were not criticisms of "official con-
duct," but were personal attacks on the integrity and honesty of the
5judges.
However, the Supreme Court held that Garrison's criticism could not
"be considered as one constituting a purely private defamation. The ac-
cusation concerned the judges' conduct of the business of the Criminal
District Court ." 0 Speaking through Justice Brennan, the Court explained:
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iae ^_ew lork Times rule is not rendered inapplicable
merely uecause an official’s private reputation, as
as Public reputation, is harmed. The public-
Oxxicial rule protects the paramount public interestm a freeflow of information to the people concerning
public officials, their servants. To this end, anything
which might touch on an official's fitness for office
is relevant.
7
Without specifically defining "official conduct," the Court argued
tnat there v/as "no difficulty in bringing [Garrison's] statement within
jdie purview of criticism of the official conduct of public officials,
O
entitled to the benefit of the New York Times rule." "Few personal
attributes," the Court explained, "are more germane to fitness for
office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though
these characteristics may also affect the official's private character."^
The Supreme Court cited Coleman v. MacLennan where, speaking of candi-
dates, the Kansas Supreme Court said that "a candidate must surrender so
much of his private character as affects his fitness for office
. .
."
0
Applying the same reasoning to public officials, the Supreme Court ruled
that "anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is
relevant."’ ‘ But, surely it would be difficult to find an aspect of an
official's private life which does not "touch on" his fitness for office.
Not until seven years later did the Court again confront the meaning
of "official conduct." In Monitor Patriot Co . v. Roy
,
the Court held
"that a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or
place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fit-
ness for office for purposes of application of the 'knowing falsehood
or reckless disregard' rule of New York Times Co . v. Sullivan ." In
Monitor Patriot Co.
,
a newspaper published a column characterizing
Alphonse Roy, a senatorial candidate, as a "former small-time bootlegger."
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Roy lost the election and sued the newspaper and the distributor of the
column for libel. The jury found that the statement did not relate to
the official conduct 11 of the candidate, and, therefore, returned a
verdict in favor of Roy. ^
Justice Stewart, who delivered the opinion of the Court, argued that
the distinction between public and private conduct, when apnlied to a
candidate for office, is practically meaningless. "Indeed," the Court
reasoned, "whatever vitality the 'official conduct' concept may retain
with regard to occupants of public office ... it is clearly of little
applicability in the context of an election campaign." A candidate
places his entire self before the electors. "Given the realities of
our political life," the Court admitted, "it is by no means easy to see
what statements about a candidate might be altogether without relevance
15
to his fitness for the office he seeks."
Thus, the Court was announcing that, at least in relation to candidates
for office, there is almost no distinction between public and private
conduct. "[W]hether there remains some exiguous area of defamation
against which a candidate may have full recourse is a question," the
1
6
Court concluded, "we need not decide in this case." The Court, therefore,
left open the possibility that there may be a very few instances which
relate to the purely private life of a candidate for office. The thrust
of the Court's opinion, however, implies that until a case actually
involving a purely private defamation is brought before the Court, the
distinction between criticism of public conduct and that of private
behavior is constitutionally irrelevant. As the Court itself has argued,
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ohe teGt has Sone "far beyond the customary meaning of the phrase 'of-
' ficial conduct. 1 "
.in ilCL-.lu. o^nr-Banner Co. v. Damron, decided the same day as Monitor
— —
*
1 the Court claimed that "Cp]ublic discussion about the qual-
ifications oi a candidate for elective office presents what is probably
the strongest possible case for application of the New York Times
.
„i8
T
~~
rule. However, as I have argued, the compass of what is relevant in
measuring fitness for office does not depend on whether the subject is
a candidate or office-holder. Indeed, the Court in Garrison
, and again in
^.Qfl^tor Patriot Co
.
,
expressed the broadest possible meaning of "offi-
cial conduct" in ruling that "anything which might touch on an official's
fitness ior oifice" lies within the scope of the concept. ^ In other
words, the range of the term is practically without limit, if the sub-
ject is either a public official or candidate for office. And, as the
Court stated in Monitor Patriot Co.
,
"it is by no means easy to see what
statements about a candidate [or office-holder] might be altogether
20
without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks."
In conclusion, it would appear that the distinction between official
and private conduct, once a component part of the New York Times rule,
is no longer constitutionally significant. The scope of the "official
conduct" concept has been stretched to include every area of private
life which has any conceivable connection with the public performance
of a political office. If there is a purely private area lying beyond
the boundaries of the reformulated meaning of "official conduct," the
Court has wisely, perhaps necessarily, neglected to define it, except
to say that if such exists, its range is "exiguous."
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In applying New York Times to the facts in Monitor Patriot Co., the
Court rightly argued that candidates for office must, and often willingly,
expose all of themselves which is relevant in appraising their fitness
for office. But this argument, of course, applies with equal force to
"public officials," as well as candidates for office. The category of
qualities relevant for fitness in office does not depend on whether the
person is seeking or already holding that office. In Monitor Patriot Co.,
the respondent, Alphonse Roy, was a candidate for office, and the Court's
argument was impelled by this fact. Yet the Court's failure to state
that its ruling applies to officials as well as candidates leaves open
^ne anomalous possibility that candidates may be criticized more freely
tnan puolic officials. But, laced with a case squarely raising this
issue, it is not likely that the Court would make this anomalous distinc-
tion. Thus, in Monitor Patriot Co . v. Roy
,
the Supreme Court greatly
expanded the "official conduct" component of Mew York Times, as it applies
to both "public officials" and candidates for office.
xhe 1 official conduct" concept of New iork Times has become nothing
more than a phrase designating any conduct or factor which may be relevant
in measuring a person's fitness for public office. When first announced
in New York Times
,
the constitutional rule was derived from the facts
of the Times case; there, the criticism was directed at the official
activities of Commissioner Sullivan. In Garrison and Monitor Patriot Co
.
,
the Court's elaboration of "official conduct" has extended the concept
to include anything
,
both public and private, which increases the public's
capacity to assess a person's fitness, as both candidate and office-holder.
4l
"Public Officials"
A second component of the New York Times rule was the "public official"
concept. In _nw .£ork Times, the Court avoided specifying the limits of
tne "public official" designation. Lower courts were, therefore, left
free to determine for themselves how New York Times was to be applied.
Jut 1 in a series of cases subsequent to Times
, the Court elaborated the
meaning of the "public official" concept, as it did with the meaning
of "official conduct," by stretching its boundaries in case after case.
-ihe process began with an attempt to specify which office-holders in
government qualify as "public officials" under the New York Times rule.
The process has now temporarily ended in a divided Court with at least
four justices convinced of the "artificiality, in terms of the public's
interest, 01 a simple distinction between 'public' and 'private' indi—
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viduals or institutions."
The "public official" concept by itself, I think, is explicit enough
to include at least elected officials and appointees such as judges and
commissioners. And, as revealed in Monitor Patriot Co . v. Roy
,
candi-
dates for elected office clearly qualify as "public officials" with
23
respect to the New York Times rule. But, as with the "official conduct
element, there is, to borrow Justice Goldberg's expression, a "gray
area," unless the Times rule applies to all persons on the public payroll
In Rosenblatt v. Baer
,
decided two years after New York Times
,
the
Court announced a test for delimiting the extent of the "public official"
24-
concept. Baer had been a supervisor of a New Hampshire county recrea-
tion area and was employed by county officials. He initiated a libel
suit against Rosenblatt, a columnist, who had allegedly intimated that
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Baer had mismanaged the recreation area. One of the questions before
tne Supreme Court was whether Baer was a "public official" under the
i^ew York Times doctrine. But, since New York Times was decided after
tne case went 'co trial, the Court held that Baer should have been permitted
to adduce proof that his libel suit fell outside the perimeter of the
. .
1
.
rnes r
'
al e * The case was therefore reversed and remanded so that "the
crial judge in tne first instance ... L could] determine whether the
proofs show [Baer] to be a 'public official.'"2^
However, in this case, the Supreme Court fashioned a test to help
lower courts determine whether certain persons are "public officials"
for purposes of New York Times
. First, the Court rejected the argument
that whether a person is a "public official" should be determined by
26
state-lav; standards. "States," the Court explained, "have developed
definitions of 'public official' for local administrative purposes,
not for purposes of a national constitutional protection."2^ If state
law were the standard, the Court reasoned, the "public official" concept
would vary from state to state.
Although Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion is Rosenblatt
,
stated that "[n]o precise lines need be drawn for the purposes of this
23
case," he nevertheless projected a rather sweeping test. He wrote:
There is, first a strong interest in debate on public
issues, and, second, a strong interest in debate about
those persons who are in a position significantly to
influence the resolution of those issues ... It
is clear, therefore, that the "public official"
designation applies at the very least to those among
the hierarchy of government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility^
for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.
I*, should be noted, first, that the Court's test includes "government
employees," not just elected officials. (Candidates for office were
included within the meaning of "public official" in Monitor Patriot Co.
v. Roy, decided five years after Rosenblatt
.) Second, the Court's test
signij.ies only "the very least" of what might be included in the "public
concept. The test, in other words, incorporates much more
into the "public official" concept than ordinary language would signify.
Furthermore, "persons who are in a position significantly to influence
the resolution 01 ... U public] issues . . ." clearly number more than
just government officials and employees. As Justice Douglas commented,
how about those who contract to carry out govern-
mental missions? Some of them are as much in the
public domain as any so-called office-holder ...
And the industrialists who raise the price of a
basic commodity? Are not steel and aluminum in the
public domain? And the labor leader who combines
trade unionism with bribery and racketeering? Surely
the public importance of collective bargaining puts
labor as well as management into the public arena so
far as the present constitutional issue is concerned.
The Court, no doubt under pressure from Justice Douglas' criticism,
attempted to restrict the possible implications of its test by further
expounding on what was meant by the term "public official." It
continued:
Where a position in government has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent
interest in the qualifications and performance of
the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and perform-
ance of all government employees, both elements
we identified in New York Times are present^and
the New York Times malice standards apply.
^
In this passage, the meaning of "public official" is limited to persons
holding "position!) s] in government." But the test, as framed by the
Court majority through Justice Brennan, "applies at the very least"
to tnose employees of the government who have substantial impact on
public issues, ourely, such a test invited speculation, as Justice
Douglas demonstrated, as to what may be beyond "the very least" meanin-
Dl tne
"Public official" concept. The Supreme Court seemed to be hinting
at a much broader meaning of "public official" within the context of
_jrw York Times. The interjection of the phrase "public issue" in all
the Court's explanations of what it meant in New York Times may suggest
that, as one observer noted, "the Supreme Court viewed the 'public offi-
cial' and 'public issue' categories as coterminous."^2
Lower courts were thus encouraged by Rosenblatt to implement the
sweeping, but uncertain, definition of "public official" announced there,
at least until the Court could construct a less nebulous extension of
the "public official" concept. There is no question that the Court was
expanding the purview of the "public official" component of the Times
rule. The problem for interpreters, of course, was "how much" and
"how far." A year after Rosenblatt
,
however, the Court, through an unusual
procedure of judicial rule-making, specifically extended the "public
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official" designation to include "public figures." Thus, the consti-
tutional protection accorded to the press in New York Times was magni-
fied as the Court enlarged the scope of the "public official" concept.
And, in so doing, the Court moved the principle of the New York Times
doctrine closer to the "public issue" criterion.
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From "Public Officials" to "Public Figures"
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Rosenblatt criticized the
Court's artificial distinction between "public" and "private" with
regard to persons who exert substantial impact on the outcome of public
issues. The president of a mammoth corporation which produces some of
the basic necessities of life, for example, certainly has an impact on
a variety o: public issues. As such, he exercises considerable power —
more, perhaps, than the average "public official."
In Curuis r'ublisning Co . v. Butts
,
decided together with Associated
i + 0 ^^ v
.
.. ,-L-^er
,
tne supreme oourt was faced with the constitutional
question whether the reach of New York Times extends to libel actions
brought not by "public officials," but by "public figures." Wally Butts,
a prominent figure in college sports, who was employed as athletic director
at the University of Georgia, sued the Curtis Publishing Company for
printing an alleged libel in the Saturday- Evening Post
. The article
accused Butts of conspiring to "fix" a football game between the Univer-
sities of Alabama and Georgia. In Associated Press v. Walker, General
Walker, retired from the military but politically active, sued the
Associated Press for printing a new dispatch which described him as
encouraging riot and violence on the campus of the University of
Mississippi while federal troops sought to enforce a court order to
enroll a black student at the university.
In applying New York Times between 1964 and 196?, lower courts v/ere
divided in many cases in their interpretations of the applicability of
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the Times doctrine. The division and confusion within the lov/er courts
was, no doubt, spawned, at least in part, by the Court's ambiguous efforts
46
to elaborate the reach of New York Times
. Butts and Talker provided the
Court with another opportunity to clarify the constitutional meaning of
—
by specifying the limits of its applicability. The Supreme
Court, nov/ever, divided in a most unusual manner. Justice Karlan,
joined oy Justices Clark, Fortas, and Stewart, announced the judgments
of the Court in both cases; Chief Justice Warren, in a concurring opinion,
joined in part by Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and White, announced
a new constitutional ruling, at least as it applied to the Walker case.
Justice Harlan distinguished Butts and Walker from New York Times,
arguing that "itlhese actions cannot be analogized to prosecutions for
seditious lioel. Neither plaintiff has any position in government which
would permit a recovery by him to be viewed as a vindication of govern-
35mental policy." It should be recalled that the ruling in New York
?imes prohibited states from punishing through civil libel laws, imper-
sonal criticism of government. Coupled with the protection for this
type of criticism was a further constitutional protection for criticism
directed at the official conduct of identifiable public officials. As
I have argued above, the Court's opinion in Rosenblatt extended, although
in ambiguous language, the application of New York Times . The thrust
of the Court's progression since New York Times was a widening of the
ambit of constitutional protection. The core protection, in Kalven's
terms, was "the central meaning" of the freedom of speech, that govern-
ment may not punish seditious libel. The next concentric circle, to
use another of Kalven's descriptions, established protection for criticism
of particular public officials. In Rosenblatt
,
the Court created another
circle broadening the ambit of protection by broadening the category
47
of "public officials," but the Court's opinion did not define the boun-
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daries of that category.
Harlan's attempt to distinguish Butts and Walker from New York Times
focused on only the "core" constitutional protection against punishment
for seditious libel. His opinion, in other words, sought to reverse
the direction which constitutional decisions had taken since New York
Times. Instead of reading the New York Times rule as having Soill
broader application, Harlan gave a narrow interpretation to the
first
amendment principle established in New York Times.
57 Justice Stewart,
in Rosenblatt, construed the meaning of New York Times m the same way.
— /
There he wrote that the rule announced in New York
Times "should not
be applied except where a State's law of defamation
has been unconsti-
tutionally converted into a law of seditious libel,"
althougn, on
the same day, he joined four other justices, including
Justice Harlan,
in applying the "actual malice" standard to a
company official involved
39
in a labor dispute.
Thus, the "actual malice" standard announced
in New York Times was
read by at least two Justices as being
applicable only .0 a narrow -uea
of libelous speech. The more liberal
Justices, however, interpreted
that narrow area as only the core of
the protection offered by ijw 12X1
Times. Justices Black and Douglas sat
alone advocating the absoluteness
of first amendment protection.
To Harlan, a new constitutional
balance of interests was needed to
cover the case of "public figures."
He recognized the need to provide
constitutional protection for criticism
aimed at public figures, since
these persons very often influence
the resolution of questions of
public
48
concern. Considerations of the "similarities and differences" involved,
he therefore argued, "lead us to the conclusion that libel actions of
tne present klnd cannot be left entirely to state libel laws, unlimited
by any overriding constitutional safeguard, but that the rigorous fed-
eral requirements of New York Times are not the only appropriate accomo-
dation of the conflicting interests at stake." He continued:
We consider and would hold that a "public figure"
who is not a puolic official may also recover dam-
ages ior a de i amatory falsehood whose substance makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a show-
ing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an
extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers.
^
Analysing Justice Harlan's words, one might seriously contend that
his new standard is no different from the New York Times "actual malice"
standard, at least the "reckless disregard" aspect of it. In the words
of one observer,
perhaps it is only a useless exercise in semantics
to attempt to distinguish "highly unreasonable con-
duct constituting an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of investigation and reporting usually (sic)
adhered to by responsible publishers" from the "reck-
less disregard of the truth" which constitutes the
second half of the "actual malice" definition.
^
However, in another part of his opinion, Harlan discusses "ordinary tort
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rules" and the "reasonable man" analogy involving tort liberty, ex-
plaining that negligent conduct which injures another has ordinarily
been measured by what a "reasonable man" might expect to be normal stan-
dards of care. But it must be emphasized that Harlan never specifically
stated the manner in which his standard was to be applied, although it
is clear that he was opting for a standard less rigorous than the Hew
^9
~~~ 2i2£s "actual malice" standard. Instead of words connoting
simple negligence, as interpreted traditionally in tort law, the
language m Harlan's new standard might be said to connote "gross
negligence," in the words of one commentator.""5 Nevertheless, Jus-
tice Harlan was attempting to create a lower, less stringent stan-
dard than "actual malice" for cases involving the alleged defamation
of "public figures." And, it was this fact which prompted both Jus-
tices Black and Douglas to concur with Chief Justice Warren in
—
L
-
er ln order t0 prevent Harlan's less rigid standard from command-
ing a plurality of the Court.
^
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren criticized the
elusive character of Harlan's standard. "I cannot believe," Warren
countered, "that a standard which is based on such an unusual and
uncertain formulation could either guide a jury of laymen or afford
the protection for speech and debate that is fundamental to our soci-
ety and guaranteed by the First Amendment. He further attacked
Harlan's position by criticizing the "differentiation between 'pub-
lic figures' and 'public officials' and the adoption of separate
standards of proof for each" as having "no basis in law, logic, or
koFirst Amendment policy." If the interest in conflict with libel
laws is the need for free public discussion of public issues
,
I would
agree with the Chief Justice in characterizing as illogical Harlan's
distinction between "public officials" and "public figures," for both
can often equally influence the outcome of public issues. On occasion,
a "public figure" has more power than does a "public official' in re-
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solving questions. of public importance. Furthermore the "public
official" has an interest no less than that of a "public figure,"
in safeguarding his reputation.
m .ho opinion, Justice Harlan stated "tnat the public interest
in the circulation of the materials here involved, and the publish-
er's interest in circulating them, is not less than that involved
47m Nop 1 ork .ir.ies
.
11 But, if the interests in free speech in Butts
and Walker are no less important than in New York Times
, why should
the standards of liability be different? Furthermore, Harlan con-
ceded, both Butts and Walker "commanded sufficient continuing public
interest and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument
to be able 'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies'
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of the defamatory statements." Not all "public officials," however,
have such ready and "sufficient access" to the media to counter criti-
cism; and, yet, the more rigorous "actual malice" standard of New
York Times applies equally to all "public officials." Moreover, some
"public figures" undoubtedly have more access to the press than do
many low-level "public officials."
Chief Justice 'Warren was joined in part by Justices Black, Brennan,
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Douglas, and White; his position, therefore, extending the applica-
tion of the New York Times rule, broadened the constitutional ambit
of first amendment protections. The standard of "actual malice" ap-
plied to criticism of both "public officials" and "public figures."
Like New York Times
,
however, the Walker case, from which the con-
stitutional ruling emerged, created at least as many problems as it
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solved. First, the problem of identifying
"public figures" is, per-
haps more difficult than that of identifying "public officials." fhe
passages in Warren's opinion which became the basis of the constitu-
tional extension of Few York Times to "public figures," were limited
to three pages of the United States Retorts
. Warren did not specif-
ically explain how judges were to recognize "public figures" for pur-
poses of applying Few York Times. He did offer some guidance, however,
in pointing to the importance of "public figures" within the context
of matters of public concern.
In many situations, policy determinations which
traditionally were channeled through formal pol-
i oical institutions are now originated and im-
plemented through a complex array of boards, com-
mittees, commissions, corporations, and associa-
tions, some only loosely connected with the Gov-
ernment. This blending of positions and power
has also occurred in the case of individuals so
that many who do not hold public office at the
moment are nevertheless intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions
or, by reason of their fame, share events in areas
of concern to society at large.
A definition of "public figure," as deciphered from the few relevant
passages in Warren's opinion, therefore, is one who is either famous in
an area of public concern or a person "intimately involved" in the out-
come of public issues. And, "surely as a class," Warren added, "these
'public figures' have as ready access as 'public officials' to mass
media 01 communication, both to influence policy and counter criticism
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of their views and activities."
As vague as this description of "public figures" appears to be, it
is, perhaps, as concrete as any other that would be broad enough to
provide adequate protection. The term "public figure" can be given
practical rneanin ' only through a rp^e> n -, T ,' ix l-o^n case- oy-ca.se method of examining the
position of each potential "public figure."
Lower courts have been forced to interpret the limits of the "nub-
lie figure" cor.cept. Judge J. Skelly Wright has defined "public fig-
ures" as "persons, who, independent of the publication in question,
occupy some place in the public spotlight, although not in a position
of governmental responsibility ."52 Such a definition, however, is
even more vague than the description extracted from Warren's opinion
m Butts and Walker. Summarizing the alternative approaches taken by
lower courts in applying New York Times
, one observer has concluded
that "to be considered within the purview of the Times privilege, an
individual must be either a nationally prominent figure, a person
who voluntarily enters the fray of public discussion on controversial
issues of pressing public concern or interest, or a person who attempts
to guide such a public policy.
This attempted catch-all definition of "public figures" as
compiled by lower courts seems too narrow. It implies that, to
be a "public figure, " a person must be either nationally well-known
or involved in matters of -pressing public importance. However,
consider the case of Ceneda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting
,
Inc.
,
decided in a lower federal court one year after Butts and
Walker
. There, Judge Madden stated that a "public figure," within
the meaning of the Times doctrine, is "anyone who is famous because
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of who he is or what he has done." Under this definition, anyone
whose name appears in print or is heard on television or radio is
a potential "public figure." As has been observed:
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a cour-c cannot assume to gainsay editorial judgment
ox newsworthiness; according to the Madden formula,
all it can look to is whether the newspaper has printed
a story about a man "because of who he is or what he
ncs aone." That mightily inclusive ground would seem
to cover practically every excuse a newspaper could
na/e .or writing about a man. Thus it appears that
newspapers are free to print whatever they will about
anyone, so long as they do so without actual malice. 55
Judge Madden's formula is no exaggeration of the "public figure"
element of the expanding New York Times doctrine. As in the Times
case, the Court majority in Walker refrained from delineating the
boundaries of the reach of constitutional protection. Lower courts,
therefore, were forced to apply the Times doctrine without guidance
other than their own intuition. Judge Madden's interpretation is a
logical extension of Chiei Justice Warren's intimations in Walker.
Three years after its decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
,
the Court, again, but very briefly, discussed the "public figure"
concept. In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn
. ,
Inc
. ,
v. Bresler,
the Court, in one short paragraph, acknowledged the wide range of pos-
sible plaintiffs included in the term "public figures."^0 The case
involved a libel suit brought against a newspaper by Bresler, whom the
Court described as "deeply involved in the future development of the
city of Greenbelt." As Justice Stewart wrote:
He had entered into agreements with the city for zoning
variances in the past, and was again seeking such favors
to permit the construction of housing units of a type
not contemplated in the original city plan. At the same
time the city was trying to obtain a tract of land owned
by Bresler for the purpose of building a school. Nego-
tiations of significant public concern were in progress,
both with school officials and the city council. Bresler'
s
status thus clearly fell within even the most restrictive
definition of a "public figure. "57
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This fragmentary reference was all the Court offered to clarify the
constitutional perimeter
-of the "public figure" addition to New York
Times. The passage, nevertheless, at least by implication, reflects
the breadth of the "public figure" designation. In the Greenbelt case,
Bresler was a real estate developer and builder in a small Maryland
city. It happens that, during the period in question, he was also a
member of the Maryland House of Delegates; however, the Court did not
consider whether Bresler was also a "public official." But, in the
Court's opinion, by being involved in land development at a time when
the city was planning to build, Bresler easily fell within "even the
most restrictive definition of a 'public figure.'"
It has been noted that the "broad public figure standard sanctioned
by Greenbelt ... brings any person that voluntarily and actively
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enters the public scene within the purview of New York Times ."
No doubt this statement is true, but it interprets the implication
in Greenbelt perhaps too narrowly; the statement implies that to be
a "public figure," for purposes of New York Times
,
one must voluntarily
enter the public scene. Bresler, of course, clearly fell within this
definition, since he was "voluntarily and actively" involved in public
affairs. But the Supreme Court explicitly noted that Bresler 's posi-
tion placed him within "even the most restrictive" meaning of the
term "public figure." What, then, might be a liberal definition of
"public figure?"
The Court's use of the words "most restrictive definition" hints
that the full reach of the "public figure" concept might very well
include more than just those persons who "voluntarily and actively"
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involve themselves in public affairs. The language in the short para-
graph in hpee>u;eg.r. does not rule out the possibility, and in fact
it might even denote, that the constitutional definition of "public
figure" approaches the extremely broad definition suggested by Judge
Madden (see aoove); that is, any newsworthy person is, by definition,
a "public figure."
Should such a rule take effect, it would have disastrous implications
i.or the ability to protect the social interest in safeguarding repu-
tations. Under such a definition, a person could be deemed a "public
figure merely by having his name become public in a newsnaper or
broadcast. If the press sees fit to make known the affairs of even
a private person, that person could be deemed newsworthy and thus,
under the Madden formula, a "public figure." And, if a defamation
suit should arise from this situation, the private person made public,
like the "public official," would have to prove "actual malice," which
is impossible to prove against a responsible publisher. Moreover, the
private person most likely has little access to the press.
This is an extreme situation, of course, and the Court probably does
not intend to go so far. But, by failing to set any limits whatsoever
to the meaning of "public figure," the Court has left open the possibility,
especially in light of its brief but far-reaching statement in Greenbelt
,
that the "public figure" concept can be easily carried to extremes.
Whether the Court actually intends to adopt the simple and limitless
Madden formula is a matter for further judicial clarification. Never-
theless, the fragmentary passage in Greenbelt clearly reveals that the
range of the "public figure" concept is very broad, indeed.
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A second question raised by the extension of New York Times in Butts
and Walker involves the kind of criticism which can constitutionally
be directed at "public figures." New York Times protected criticism
aimed at the "official conduct" of "public officials." But, is there
any limit to what can be said about "public figures?" Except for a few
words by Chief Justice Warren in Butts and Walker
, the Court has not
made any pronouncements which might provide an answer to the question.
Warren argued that the "views and actions [of "public figures"] with
respect to public issues and events are often of as much concern to
the citizen as the attitudes and behavior of 'public officials' with
respect to the same issues and events." ' And, Warren added, since
"public figures ... often play an influential role in ordering
society . . . [o]ur citizenry has a ligitimate and substantial interest
in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in
uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events
is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials .'"" 0
From these two sentences from Warren's opinion in Butts and Walker
,
one can conclude that the extension of New York Times embodies the right
to criticize the "views," "actions," and "conduct" of "public figures"
concerning "their involvement in public issues and events." To state
these categories, however, is merely to reiterate the question. As I
have tried to demonstrate in an earlier section of this chapter, the
Court's elaboration of the "official conduct" element in New York Times
expanded the meaning of that term to include anything in the official's
life which might have a bearing on his fitness for public office.
Since "public figures" must be recognized as having "an influential
role in ordering society," to use Warren's words, does anything
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which might shed light on their performance of chat role thereby become
the standard for application of the Times rule? The answer to the
question must await further judicial clarification. Still, with or
without further elaboration, lower courts must necessarily determine
m each case whether the person libeled is a "public figure," and
whether the defamatory statements pertain to his involvement in
public matters.
Tne third, and most important, question presented by the extension
of the Times doctrine is whether the extension to "public figures" is
merely a way station along the road the Court has paved since New York
-
‘ 1
-
rnes ‘ In other words, is debate on public issues the criterion for
constitutional protection? If so, limiting the protection created in
New York Times to criticism of "public officials" and "public figures"
presents the same illogical line-drawing which Chief Justice Warren
attributed to Justice Harlan's refusal to extend New York Times to
"public figures." Can not a "private person," who is neither a "public
official" nor a "public figure," have some impact on the outcome of
public issues? To use Justice Douglas's example, what about "the
industrialists who raise the price of a basic commodity?""' 1 It might
oe argued, of course, that the industrialists involved are "public fig-
ures" under the ruling Associated Press v. Walker
. But, consider the
ordinary butcher who is erroneously accused of selling bad meat. Surely
this is a matter of public concern. However, it would be stretching
the meaning of the term to consider the ordinary butcher a "public
figure," unless he is famous because of some other matter, or unless
one adopts the extremes of the Madden formula. Under the latter standard,
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as 1 have argued above, the "public figure" designation becomes bound-
less by allowing the press to make "public figures" out of otherwise
private individuals.
However, the question of the breadth of the protection created in
:iev;
- orl<:: and subsequent cases still remains. Harry Kalven,
commenting on the Butts and Walker cases, noted that the Court "has
done exactly what would have been expected from New York Times.
But, it still is not certain whether the Court will continue that
course of expanding the ambit of free expression to include protection
for debate on public issues not involving "public figures/officials."
From "Public Figures" to "Public Issues"?
Within New York Times itself, there are several intimations that the
fundamental guarantee of the first amendment is the protection of debate
on public issues. Indeed, the most celebrated passage from the Court's
opinion is the statement of "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
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and wi de-open ..." Harry Kalven has commented that "[w]hat catches
the eye [about these words] is the daring, unconventional selection
of adjectives. These words capture the special quality of the Court's
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stance toward first amendment issues."
In another passage from the Court's opinion in Times , Justice Brennan
refers to ,r t]he general proposition that freedom of expression upon
public questions is secured by the First Amendment" and that this
proposition "has long been settled by our decisions." "Mr. Justice
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Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney, v. California
the Court stated
’ "^ve the principle its classic formulation, when
ne said: "Ctlhose who won our independence believed
. . . that public
discussion is a political duty."b? Of course, Brandeis was talking
aoout the protection of political speech. The Court, however, has
repeatedly cited earlier cases such as Whitney in supporting the ar-
gument that L.t]he guarantees for speech and press are not the pre-
serve of political expression or comment upon public affairs ..."
At another point in New York Times
, the Court cited Coleman v.
£u. t
_
cnenran where the Kansas Supreme Court announced the privilege to
discuss "a great variety of subjects,
. . . including] matters of
public concern, public men, and candidates for office.
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The Supreme Court had explicitly recognized in past decisions that
debate on public matters was protected by the first amendment. In
New York Times
,
however, the Court expanded the protection afforded
to a particular area of debate— criticism of public officials— by
establishing a particularly strong constitutional safeguard. Of
course, since the facts of the Times case involved alleged criticism
of a public official, the Court limited its extension of the newly
created guarantee to cases involving public officials. Thus, it v/ould
not be fair to criticize the Court for not revolutionizing all state
libel laws in one sweep.
Because the Times opinion was buttressed here and there with
references to debate on public issues, it was logical to expect,
as some lower courts anticipated, that the constitutional rule would
be extended to protect all matters of public concern, regardless of
6o
whether the discussion involved criticism of a public official
lost lower courts, however, to use one observer's words
,
nave tried to work within the language of the [Tines]
case, rather than to implement the first amendment
principles implicit in the opinion. They have almost
uniformly sought to apply or withhold the privilege
on tne basis of whether the complainant was enough
lix:e ca puolic official to warrant the application of
the Times rule.
The general feeling, nevertheless, was an expectation that the Supreme
Court would inevitably broaden the range of application of New York
72limes. In associated Press v. Walker
,
as we have seen, the Court
extended the reach of constitutional protection to debate involving
P^41ic figures. And, in tnat case, Cnief Justice Warren bolstered
the belief that further extension was forthcoming when he referred
to the New York Times standard as "an important safeguard for the
rights of the press and public to inform and be informed on matters
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of legitimate interest."
Five months before Butts and Walker
,
the Supreme Court decided
74Time, Inc , v. Hill . The case involved a suit brought by James Hill
against Life Magazine under a New York statute which established a
right of privacy. The statute, as construed by the New York courts,
created a cause of action against a publication which makes a person the
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subject of a "fictitious" report. In 1952, James Hill and his family
were kept hostage in their home by escaped convicts. The family was
released unharmed, and no violence occurred. They subsequently moved
away and discouraged further publicity regarding the occurrence.
Soon thereafter, a novel was published which described a similar
event, except that the novel depicted scenes of violence. Later,
6l
the novel was made into a play, and Life published a story about the
play and related it to the Hill incident by printing photographs of
the inside of the former Hill home, and adding captions tying the
incidents m the play to the Hills' experience. Under the New York
statute, Jair.es Hill sued for damages, alleging that Life knowingly
gave the false impression that the play depicted what had happened
to them. The New York courts sustained a judgment against Time, Inc.,
the owner of the magazine, ultimately awarding Hill $30,000.^°
nl though ^ime was not a libel case, it is nevertheless important
to the discussion of the applicability of New York Times
. Justice
Brennan spoke for the Court in an opinion joined by Justice White,
Stewcj.ru, Black, Douglas, and, in part, Harlan. Instead of a mere
negligence standard, the Court insisted that the New York Times
ccC uual malice standard should have been applied at the trial level
in Time
. "We hold," Brennan stated, "that the constitutional protec-
tions for speech and press preclude the application of the New York
statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the
absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowl-
edge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. The
subject of the Life article, the Court added, was "no doubt ... a
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matter of public interest."
The stronger constitutional shield provided by the "actual malice"
standard was necessary in protecting matters of public concern because
the Court argued, "[a] negligence test would place on the press the
intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reason-
ableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every
62
reierence to a name, picture or portrait." Negligence, the Court
continued, "would be a most elusive standard
. .
. [and] would present
a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising the consti-
tutional guarantees." 7^
And, as to the interest of persons injured by erroneous publica-
tions, Justice Brennan noted that
Lejxposure of the self to others in varying degrees
is a concomitant oi life in a civilized community.
The risk of this exposure is an essential incident
of life in a society which places a primary value on
freedom of speech and of press. 80
rt.s a balancing oi interests, therefore, the Court concluded that the
value of free speech must be given greater weight than the interest in
a right to privacy, at least in the absence of knowing falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth. From Time
,
Inc , v. Hill one can
discern, to use Kalven's words, a "general rule . . . that if defen-
dant's statement deals with newsworthy events and people, it is privi-
leged, that is, it cannot be made the predicate for tort liability."
"We are being reminded," Kalven concludes, "that newsworthiness defines
O/J
the ambit of constitutional concern ..."
The same arguments the Court made in Time involving privacy could
be employed to extend the application of the New York Times "actual
malice" standard to defamation cases involving matters of public
concern. In Time the Court maintained that negligence is "a most
elusive standard," placing an "intolerable burden" on the press. As
a standard, negligence would promote self-censorship. In the context
of privacy cases, the Court was stating that a negligence standard is
insufficient to guarantee a free press. But, if a negligence test is
"a most elusive standard" and an "intolerable burden" on the press,
it does not become more concrete and less of a burden in defamation
cases. In other words, by implying that "actual malice" is the only
standard which can adequately safeguard the freedom of the press, the
Court was providing a basis for extension of New York Times to all
cases involving matters of public interest. As Harry Kalven asks,
since Time was decided five months before Butts and Walker
,
"
n
w]hy
was it necessary m Butts and Walker to make a fresh argument" on the
reach of New York Times?°^
However, perhaps to maintain the votes of Justices Stewart and/or
White
,
Brennan, writing the opinion in Time
, specifically limited
the ruling to tne discrete context" of the case. "We find applicable
here," mrennan wrote, "the standard of knowing or reckless falsehood,
not through blind application of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan
,
relating solely to libel actions by
public officials, but only upon consideration of the
factors which arise in the particular context of the
aPPli ca-tion of the New York statute in cases involving
private individuals. This is neither a libel action
by a private individual nor a statutory action by a
public official. Therefore, although the First Amend-
ment principles pronounced in New York Times guide our
conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying
these principles in this discrete context.
But the Court did not foreclose the possibility of extending the "actual
malice" standard to libelous publications involving matters of public
interest. And, four years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia
,
Inc
. ,
the
84
Court was directly faced with that question.
This case involved a libel suit initiated by George Rosenbloom against
Metromedia, Inc., a broadcasting company which had aired a report of
his arrest for distributing allegedly obscene magazines. The magazines
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were subsequently xound not to be legally obscene, and after his
acquittal, Eosenbloom filed his suit against the company.
At the trial, the jury awarded Eosenbloom $25,000 in general damages
and $725,000 in exemplary damages, which were later reduced to $250,000.
However, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the judgment. The court maintained that the subject
of the oroadcast involved a matter of public concern and that "the •
fact that plaintiff was not a public figure cannot be accorded decisive
importance if the recognized important guarantees of the First Amend-
ment are to be adequately implemented." The Court of Appeals, therefore,
ruled that the New York Times "actual malice" standard applied.
^
In its disposal of Eosenbloom
, the Supreme Court divided, reaching
a judgment, but unable to agree on a constitutional rule governing the
case. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Black agreed with Brennan's main
argument, although he did not join the entire opinion. Justice White
concurred in the result, but for reasons different from those of the
plurality. Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented, while
Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the
86
case.
Justice Brennan, who announced the judgment of the Court, conceded
that
[a]lthough the limitations upon civil libel actions,
first held in New York Times to be required by the
First Amendment, were applied in that case in the con-
text of defamatory falsehoods about the official conduct
of a public official, later decisions have disclosed
the artificiality, in terms of the public's interest,
of a simple distinction between "public" and "private"
individuals or institutions.
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In explaining his position, Bre
Justice Warren had employed in
to criticism of public figures,
.merman carried the argument to
nnan used the same logic which Chief
.'6x
.
lkcr to extend the Times privilege
In fosenbloom
,
however, Justice
its full and final conclusion:
iu is clear that there has emerged from our cases decided
since New York Times the concept that the First Amendment'simpact upon state libel laws derives not so much from
whether the plaintiff is a "public official," "public fig-
ure," or "private individual," as it derives from the question
whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a
matter of public interest. 88
'kne public's primary interest," Brennan proclaimed, "is in the event,"
not whether the person involved is a public official or public figure. 89
j.nd, he continued, "Ci]f a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did
not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved."90
As I have tried to point out above, the Court's opinions in libel
cases, beginning with New York Times
,
have intimated that the first
amendment protects the right freely to discuss public matters. But,
the constitutional doctrine explicitly announced by the Court was limited
to the "public official" and "public figure" rules. In Rosenbloom
,
Justice Brennan felt that "the time has come forthrightly to announce
that the determinant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel
actions is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public
91
or general concern ..." He recalled his own passage from New
York Times recognizing a "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." This time, however, Brennan underscored the words "public
,,92issues.
"
r rGO
,;i’h Justice Douglas not participating in Hosenbloom
. the final
exte^io.* o. a__
__ia1 was, at least temporarily, precluded,
nad he taken part in the case, I am. sure that Brennan's position would
have become constitutional law. In Time, Inc. v . Hill, and again in
Curtis' Puoln shxn
,;
Co. v. Butts, both Black and Douglas consented to
join the opinion of three other justices, to use Black's words, "in
order for the Court to be able at this time to agree on an opinion
in this important case based on the prevailing constitutional doctrine
expressed in New York Times Co. v. Cullivan ."93 There is no reason
to believe that Black and Douglas this time would have ignored the
opportunity to bring the Times doctrine closer to their absolutist
views. But since Douglas did not participate and a majority was
unable to agree with Brennan's thesis, Elack felt no need fully to
concur in an opinion which would not become law. In a short concur-
ring opinion he did acknowledge his agreement with Brennan's state-
ment that the first amendment protection extends to "all discussion
and communica uion involving matters of public or general concern,
without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anony-
9/+
mous." However, Black did not elaborate his agreement except to
repeat his belief that freedom of the press is absolute.
Justice White criticized Brennan and the dissenters for engaging
in "a purely intellectual" and "theoretical" exercise since no consti-
tutional agreement could be reached. The case, White insisted, could
have been decided on a narrower ground within the context of the New
York Times rule. He concurred in the decision to sustain the Court
of Appeals, basing his decision on the conclusion that "” d] iscussion
6?
of the conduct of public officials cannot ... be subjected to arti-
ficial limitations designed to protect others involved in an episode
witn officials from unfavorable publicity."95 Thus, Justice White
would apply the "actual malice" standard of New York Times to defama-
tion suits brought by private individuals as long as the publication's
central discussion focuses on official conduct. ""T]he First Amend-
ment," ne explained, "gives the press and broadcast media a privilege
to report and comment upon official actions of public servants in full
detail, with no requirement that the reputation or the privacy of an
individual involved in or affected by the official action be spared
from public view.' ,96
nosenoloor.,
,
.vnite maintained, should nave been decided on this
narrower ground. However, he did not dismiss the possibility that
in a later case, he might accept the Brennan position. He had been
among the Court majority which held, in Time
,
Inc , v. Kill
,
that the
"actual malice" test applies in privacy suits brought against persons
making false statements regarding matters of public concern. And, in
Fosenbloom
,
White acknowledged that Brennan's arguments for extending
New York Times to public issues "are by no means frivolous ." 95 "But,"
he added, "I would not nullify a major part of state libel law until
we have given the matter the most thorough consideration and can articu-
late some solid First Amendment grounds based on experience and our
98present condition." In a future libel case, if the Court should
agree on a majority position extending coverage of New York Times
to matters of public concern, I would not be surprised to find Justice
White in that majority.
Commenting on Justice White's opinion in Rosenbloom
. Justice Brennan
m fact stated that " o]ur Brother White agrees that the protection
ai xorded by the First Amendment depends on whether the issue involved
m the publication is an issue of general or public concern," although
"[h]e would . . . confine our holding to the situation raised by the
^acus in this case, that is, limit it to issues involving 'offical
actions of public servants."'^ However, nowhere in his opinion does
Justice White explicitly, or even implicitly, state that first amend-
ment protection "depends" on whether the issue involved is a natter
of public interest. His argument and the language he chooses to build
nis argument are careiully restricted to a discussion of the impor-
tance of debate involving the official conduct of public officials.
Perhaps Brennan's comment on White’s position was an unintentional
(or aeliberate) disclosure oi White's views in conference or, more
likely, an earlier draft of White's opinion.
If White should subsequently agree with the Brennan position,
then a majority — Brennan, Blackmun, Douglas, Burger, and White
—
would exist for extending the application of New York Times to any
libelous publication or broadcast which involves a matter of public
interest. ^ And, even if White should not adopt Brennan's thesis,
there is still the possibility that one of the subsequently appointed
Justices will do so. Thus, with at least four justices expressly
committed to the "public issue" criterion, there exists the real
possibility that further expansion will be made of the New York Tines
rule. But, this ultimate reformulation of New
.
York Times would prac-
tically displace state libel law, and, in effect, would virtually make
it impossible to protect the social interest in safeguarding reputations.
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"Actual Malice"
TLuS ftir in tnis chaPter, I have been examining the Court's delin-
eation of the reach of the New York Times standard of liability. The
problem has been defining the range of subjects of discussion to which
one "actual malice" standard applies. But an equally important, and,
perhaps, more dix^icult question has involved the meaning of this
standard in practice. When the Court first announced the "actual mal-
ice" rule in New York Times
,
Justice Black denounced it as "elusive,
abstract
.
. ,
hard to prove and hard to disprove." At most, he
cautioned, the standard would provide an "evanescent protection" for
101free speech rights.
Actual malice," of course, is much more concrete than previous li-
ability standards, such as "ill-will," "bad motive," or, even, "negli-
gence." The standard imposes liability if one of two, or both, cri-
teria are met: knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. And
the burden of proving actual malice is on the plaintiff, a task much
greater than it would be under a liability standard such as "ill-will."
One UcaS to prove that tne deiendant knew the falsity of his defamatory
statements, or acted in reckless disregard of the truth. And proof, the
Court explained, must be demonstrated with "convincing clarity." 02
The first aspect of the Times rule cannot be written in words more
precise than those uged by the Court. "Knowing falsity" cannot mean
anything other than "knowing falsity." But when can speech be declared
to be in "reckless disregard of the truth?" One man's standard of
"reckless disregard" may easily be another's concept of "negligence."
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As Justice Holmes once said, words are not crystals. 103 As with any
legal standard or formula, the judgment whether actual malice has
been met must be made by ordinary mortals, whose measuring devices
vary substantially in sensitivity and bias.
In a few cases subsequent to New York Times
, the Supreme Court
nas tried turther to explain how the term "actual malice" is to be
applied. In Garrison, for example, the Court used the words "cal-
culated falsehood" and "the known lie" in explaining "knowing falsi-
,,104
Also m Jam son
,
the Court asserted that "only those false
ty.'
statements made with a high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil
or criminal sanctions." 103 Here the Court was referring to "reckless
disregard," since knowing something is false is not the same thing as
knowing it is probably false.
ihe Coir u emphasized that "the known lie" is no essential part of
any exposition of ideas and, thus, deserves no constitutional protec-
^iOi>.. And, ohe court concludea, "knowing falsity" equals "the known
lie;" "reckless disregard of the truth" is simply knowing that the
libelous statements are probaoly false, m St . Amant v. Thompson
, de-
cided four years after Garrison
, this is exactly what the Court ruled.
l0j
St. Amant is particularly significant because an intermediate state
court of appeal ruled that there was no evidence of actual malice. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, finding that there had been suf-
ficient evidence to conclude that the defendant had acted in reckless
disregard of the truth. Finally, the United States Supreme Court, ex-
amining the evidence for itself, found that there was no actual malice
71
involved. The case, therefore,
of judicial measuring rods.
clearly demonstrates the variability
fne case involved a television speech during which St. Amant, a
candidate for public office, read the answers to questions which he
had previously asked a local union member. The answers falsely charged
Tnompson
,
St. Amant 's opponent in the election, with criminal conduct.
Thompson sued St. Amant for libel, and the trial court awarded him.
;?5
’
00°. The trial was before the Court's ruling in New York
Times
,
but the Louisiana courts applied the actual malice test on
appeal since, by then, Lev; iprk Times had been announced.
iiie Louisiana supreme Court ruled that St. Amant broadcasted the
false charges recklessly, although not knowingly. He did not know
whether his opponent had engaged in criminal activities, and, the
Louisiana court explained, he did not attempt to verify the infor-
mation, but read the false answers without concern for the conse-
quences.
ihe Supreme Court oi the United States, however, speaking through
Justice White, rejected the Louisiana court's application of the
"actual malice" standard, ruling that
reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reason-
ably prudent man would have published, or would have
investigated before publishing. There must be suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defen-
dant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts
shows reckless disregard for £ruth or falsity and
demonstrates actual malice.
Thus, "knowing falsity" is simply "knowing falsity;" the term cannot
be made more direct. Under the test developed in St. Amant "reckless
disregard" is specifically narrowed down to "[publishing . . . [with]
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serious doubts as to the truth ]of the libelous statements]
. Prior
to St. Amant, "reckless disregard" could conceivably have been inter-
preted as reckless, "slipshod and sketchy investigatory techniques,"
suer, as failing to check the accuracy of reported statements, when
fully aware of the harm that might result from publication. But even
this is not necessarily an awareness of probable falsity. 10^
Jnder St. Amant, ''reckless disregard” is just one step away from
"knowing ialsity;" "actually,” one observer has noted, the two halves
of the actual malice standard are "close kindred.”110 To meet the
standard oi actual malice, then, a plaintiff must convincingly prove
that the defendant was either consciously aware that the defamatory
statements were false or seriously doubted whether they were in fact
true.
This more refined and narrower definition of actual malice is by
no means a cure-all for the problems associated with the implementa-
tion oj. the actual malice standard of liability. By defining reckless
disregard in terms of awareness of probable falsity, the Court, in
u.act, created a very serious problem. Not all libelous statements
involve factual matters which are either true or false; many libels
derive from opinion or comment which seriously injures the reputation
of individuals. For example, as one critic has argued, "[a] statement
that a senator is mentally unbalanced, or that a hotel is dilapidated
and overpriced, or that a doctor is a quack, is a statement which,
although factual in form, is so intermixed with sentiment that an
111
adjudication of the issue 'truth vel non' would be fatuous.
Actual malice depends on whether the defendant knew or seriously
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doubted
statemen
ious, th
the ^ruth of allegedly/ defamatory statements. However
,
when
ts cannot definitively be
e actual malice standard,
deemed false, although verv injur-
in :>t « -.mar
t
, cannot be
applied meaningfully.
Another problem is that the actual malice requires a probing of the
defendant's state of mind. Thus, the striking specific language
employed in the Court's standard of liability notwithstanding, the
actual malice test becomes in practice one of interpreting the mental
condition of the defendant at the time he contemplated and published
nis lioeious statements. Proving reckless disregard, defined as a
^ 3gh degree Oi awareness of the probable falsity of the challenged
statements, involves an assessment of the conduct and mental condition
of the defendant. As the uourt in St
. Amant noted, it is not enough
to measure "reckless disregard" as a failure to investigate. There
must be convincing proof that the defendant was plainly aware that
the statements were most likely false. Clearly, this is an extremely
narrow definition of reckless disregard. Nevertheless, the application
of the test must in many cases be made with human judgment, irrespective
of its fallibility.
Recognizing that the actual malice standard may be erroneously
applied or interpreted in the vital area of free speech, the Court,
in every libel case decided with opinion, has made an independent
examination of the facts to determine for itself whether the standard
of liability has been met. Chief Justice Warren has referred to the
Court's review of the facts as "the final duty v/hich this Court has
when violations of fundamental constitutional principles are alleged.
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ne explainea
> ">-w]e must review the evidence to ascertain whether the
judgment can stana consistently with those principles." ^
words of Justice Brennan, "this Court has an 'obligation to test
cnailer, ed judgments against the guarantees of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments,' and in doing so 'this Court cannot avoid making
an indeoendent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case.'
The simple „ac^ is, msnnan conduced, "that the First Amendment
queo tions o± constitutional xact ' compel this Court's de novo review."
Thus, the Supreme Court has undertaken the task of independently
determining in each case whether the actual malice standard has been
114
met. however, some members oi the Court have become disenchanted
with the Court's procedure. Justice Black, for example, argued that
"what we do in these circumstances is to review the factual questions
in cases decided by juries — a review which is a flat violation of the
*1 A £T
Seventh Amendment." 1 The Court's independent review of the facts of
each case, he claimed, would destroy the certainty and stability in the
law. "No one," he contended, "including this Court, can know what is
and what is not constitutionally ... libelous under this Court's
ruling .... [T]he Court is suggesting various experimental expe-
dients in libel cases," Black concluded, "all of which boil down to a
determination of how offensive to this Court a particular libel judg-
.
.
„116
ment may be . . . ."
Justice Harlan cautioned that de novo review, if undertaken in’ case
117
after case, could result in the ineffective functioning of the Court.
And, Justice Marshall argued that the Court is "constitutionalizing . . .
the fact finding process." "[S]uch an approach," he warned, "will
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require this Court to engage in a constant and continuing supervision
oi defamation litigation throughout the country." 119 These arguments
are important criticisms of the judicial function.
5utl at least in first amendment cases, the Court has made a consid-
eration of the specific facts of each case a concomitant of applying
constitutional principles, because de novo review is sometimes essen-
tial zo the safeguarding of free speech rights. Had the Court, for
example, remanded the New York Times case without first ruling that
the evidence was constitutionally insufficient for a finding of "actual
malice," it is most likely that the Alabama courts would have concluded
that the Times acted with ’’actual malice." The Court’s de novo review,
in fact, may prove to be the ultimate means of overcoming a hostile
court and jury, such as those involved in the New York Times case.
Insiouing on the need to review the facts, several members of the
Court have been willing, to arrive at equitable results, in the words
of .Justice Marshall, "at a substantial cost in predictability and
120
certainty." But if the Court is to set limits to the freedom of
speech and press, it must create rules. As Justice Brennan correctlv
stated, "Cn]o matter how the problem is approached, this Court would
ultimately have to fashion constituional definitions
. . jn
St. Amant
,
Justice White recognized precisely the problem involved
in making constitutional definitions. Speaking of "reckless disregard,"
he said that a constitutional standard "cannot be fully encompassed
in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be
marked out through case-by-case adjudication, as is true with so many
122
standards for judging concrete cases . . .
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CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION
Beginning with Hew York Tines in 1964, the United States Supreme.
Court has written the constitutional law of libel. The process of con-
stitutional law-making has been one of balancing the conflicting inter-
ests of protecting reputations and the freedom of expression. Prior to
— tile balance in a majority of states had been weighted
unevenly in that the interest in free speech and press was not given
adequate protection. Before the Court's intervention in 1964, libel
had been considered outside the scope of the first amendment. Since
.9u4, however, the Court has sought to rectify the imbalance by placing
constitutional limits on state law in accordance with the principles of
free speech and press established in the first amendment.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia
,
the most recent libel case decided by
the Supreme Court, the final extension of the New York Times actual mal-
ice standard almost became constitutional law. In New York Times, the
Court created tne actual malice standard and expressly limited its
application to cases involving the alleged defamation of public officials,
jjater, the Court applied the standard to cases involving public figures,
and to a privacy case involving a matter of general public interest. And,
-l o oeems that one court is prepared to make "matters of public or general
concern" the constitutional criterion for application of the actual malice
test in defamation cases. However, this ultimate extension, if left
unmodified, would again tilt the scales into imbalance by giving free
speech protection a "preferred position," while almost totally ignoring
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tne £oclal interest in protecting reputation.
In the evolutionary process of extending application of New York Tin.es
.
the Court has relied on the first amendment, logic, and precedent. The
first amendment protects the public's right to discuss and debate public
issues. And, logic argues, if the first amendment protects equally the
discussion of all public issues, the lieu York Times privilege cannot
logically be limited to discussion of public officials. This was the
argument of Chief Justice Warren in Talker
,
extending the actual malice
rule to debate about public figures. Surely, public figures have a
substantial impact on the outcome of important political and social
decisions. Justice Brennan also used this same argument in Bosenbloom
where he advocated the extension of Kew York Times to discussion of
all matters of public or general concern.
Bolstering logic, the Court has several times quoted passages from
previous cases supporting the proposition that the first amendment pro-
jects more than political speech. "Freedom of discussion, if it would
full ill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members
01 society to cope with the exigencies of their period."' And, "ft]he
line oetween the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection ... of [freedom of the press]. In other words, as Jus-
tice Brennan has said, 'Ttlhe guarantees for speech and press are not
the preserve of political expression and comment upon public affairs."^
;.o one would disagree with the view that the freedom of expression
includes more than the right to discuss political affairs. The public,
indeed, has the right and need to express its views freely on matters
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of public interest. Reviews of plays, books, and
.ovies, for instance,
are a form of expression which certainly merits constitutional protec-
tion. Discussion of any issue of public concern, althouEh it may not be
vital to the governmental process, requires constitutional protection
to ensure the freedom to communicate ideas.
It would, of course, be logical and consistent to apply the actual
malice standard to defamation cases involving matters of public con-
cern, regardless o: whether the person defamed is a public official,
public figure, or private individual. The concern of the first amend-
ment is with protection of the right freely to communicate. However,
t-re mw ior-1 limes standard of actual malice should not be "logically"
applied across-the-board to all libelous publications which discuss
matters of public interest or concern, unless provisions are made to
ensure mat the person defamed has sufficient means to repudiate the
defamatory charges made against him.
me simple solution posed by Justice Brennan, in his opinion in Sosen-
-Oloor.:
,
would remedy the proolem involved in the conflict between libel
law and the first amendment by applying the actual malice test to all
cases involving a matter of public or general concern. Taken by itself,
this solution, as a balancing of interests, is too sweeping; it blindly
elevates the freedom of expression and ignores certain important factors
which need consideration.
Although the first amendment embraces the freedom of expression, there
are different values of expression. It is one thing, for example, to
argue that an individual has a constitutional right to produce an "X"
rated film; it is quite another, however, to equate this kind of speech
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Wltn tne cri -lcal discussion of governmental operations. There is a
vast difference between the public's right to criticize its official
leaders and its right to capture pornography in words and film. Even
uustice Brennan implicitly acknowledges a scale of values embodied in
the freedom of expression when he states that "Cc]riticism of govern-
ment is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of
4-iree discussion. " ' The first amendment does, indeed, safeguard the
values of free expression, but it need not do so with identical stan-
dards 0^ pro tec oion. Di^ferenc interests are involved and must be con-
sidered in creating constitutional protection.
Within the area o^. libel, cases exist in which the interests are
strikingly difierent, although the focus of the discussion may be very
similar. Libelous criticism of the President of the United States, for
example, entails a clearly different situation from that when defama-
tory statements injure a private individual who inadvertently becomes
caught in the midst of a public debate. The President, as the center
of attention in American politics and in the press, is in a position
to successfully respond in defense. He has instant access to the media.
The private citizen, on the other hand, ordinarily has no access to the
press, and, when erroneously defamed, he is left helpless and injured.
His only recourse, under Justice Brennan's solution, would be to prove
actual malice on the part of the publisher who defamed him, and this is
almost impossible to prove since most publishers do not deliberately lie.
The two situations are entirely different, notwithstanding the content
of the publications. Yet Justice Brennan's solution would provide the
same standard of protection for the publications because both involve
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matters of public concern. Riding on a theoretical principle of first
amendment theory, Justice Brennan ignores the practical implications
of his balance of interests.
moreover,
-he "matter of public or general concern" criterion for
rhe application of the lev York Times standard has far-reaching and
dangerous implications. The determination of what is a public matter
is a more difficult problem than that of defining "public official" or
puolic figure." 'The perimeter of the "public concern" concept will
become at best imaginary when judges try to implement the criterion in
real cases. In kosenbloom
, Justice Brennan wisely and necessarily did
not mark the boundaries of the term "matter of public or general concern.
ne ins^eaci postponed "the delineation of the reach of that term to future
5
cases."
But, as Justice Marshall correctly asserted, "all human events are
arguably within the area of 'public or general concern.'" 0 And, as
Henry V. Nickel notes:
The problems involved in determining what is
"private" and what is "public" for the purposes
of the privilege may well serve to destroy all
defamation laws. Logically, any issue about
which the public might form an opinion could
become a public issue ... .7
Justice Brennan denied that the category of "matters of public or
general concern" was open-ended. "jS]ome aspects of the lives of even
the most public men," he insisted, "fall outside the area of matters
of public or general concern."'3 Here, he cited Griswold v. Connecticut—
which involved the use of contraceptive devices
—
presumably as an example
of what may lie outside the definition of public matters. "But," as
n
8l
auspice harshall replied, "it is apparent that in an era of dramatic
threat of overpopulation and one in which previously accented standards
01 conduct are widely heralded as outdated, even the intimate and per-
sonal concerns with which the Court dealt in that case cannot be said
to be ouuside the area of 'public or general concern.'"^
Furthermore, private matters once made public through a media publica-
tion or broadcast, no longer remain private. In other words, the press
can make a private affair public, merely by publishing a private con-
cern as a newsworthy event. Perhaps Justice Brennan did not intend
that the constitutional protection be extended to matters of public
curiosity. But who are judges to rule that a matter of public concern
is really a matter of public curiosity,' and, therefore, does not fall
within the ambit of constitutional protection? The distinction be-
tween public curiosity and public concern is much too fragile and elu-
sive to be made. Involving judges in such line-drawing may throw the
the judicial process into an absurd but serious embroglio. Asking the
judiciary to determine without caprice what is and what is not of pub-
lic concern will result in a disintegration of the "private affairs"
concept, since anything published is almost by definition "public."
Forcing the courts to draw chimerical lines between matters of public
concern and matters not of public concern v/ill inevitably result in
subjecting the courts, and finally the Supreme Court, to a humiliating
criticism of the kind endured, when courts attempt to define obscenity.
The task is simply not amenable to the process of judicial decision-
making.
Another implication of Brennan's solution involves the actual malice
standard. Defined as "knowing falsity" or "awareness of probable fal-
si-cy," cue standard is set so high that it effectively insulates the
prose by rranting the press an unconditional privilege, as Ion- r.s a
minimum of care is observed. Very few publishers deliberately print
or oroadcast known lies or statements which are believed to be probable
lies. But by publishing defamatory falsehoods, a publisher is still
capable of inflicting serious injury on the subject of the publication,
ihat injury, ^ur-nermore, is frequently irreparable, since most people
do not have the means to repudiate through the media defamatory accusa-
tions made against them.
Since the reach of the "public concern" concept is, in practice, open-
ended, and since the actual malice standard is so high, the concern for
the interest in the reputation of the falsely defamed private individual
becomes negligible under the solution offered by Justice Brennan. The
private person usually has no access to the press, and thus his injury
must be endured, while the public remains misinformed.
Justice Brennan's position in Posenbloom
,
which may soon become the
position of the Court majority, confers upon the press an enormous power,
which can be both destructive and constructive. But the destructive
capacity of the press has been largely played down in the opinions of
the Court and some individual justices. Yet the press, as Walter Lipp-
mann recognized over fifty years ago, has a power "unlike any that has
been exercised since the Pope lost his hold on the secular mind."
^
Today, that power has been magnified by the increasing technological
advancement; a oerson's reputation can be destroyed today in a matter o±
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minxes as false statements are broadcast
privacy can instantly be taken away if he
across the nation. A person's
oi.Ould inadvertently be caught
in tne middle o: a public controversy solas!
ox prominent newspapers.
ned across the front pages
Ihe press is an extremely powerful agent in
cal beliefs and in influencing the outcome of
has a very real impact on the way people vote.
the formation of politi-
important decisions. It
It is nonsense to argue 1
as Justice Black often did, that if the press is not given an absolute
license to publish whatever it feels is newsworthy, the first araendraent
ireedom of expression will be sadly doomed to destruction.
Instead, i agree with Justice White's comment in Hosenbloom where
he wrote:
i am unaware that state libel lav/s with respect
to private citizens have proved a hazard to the
existence or operations of the communications
industry in this country. Some members of the
Court seem haunted by fears of self-censorship
by the press and of damage judgments that will
threaten its financial health . .
. [However]
I am not aware that self-censorship has caused
the press to tread too gingerly in reporting
"news" concerning private citizens and private
affairs or that the reputation of private citi-
zens has received inordinate protection from
falsehood. 1 1
Making Justice Brennan's solution to the conflict between libel and
free speech the law of the land would unjustifiably deny any protection
to the falsely defamed private person unless he can convincingly prove
that his defamer knew that the statements were false or that they were
most likely false, or unless the person defamed has sufficient access to
the press to repudiate the defamatory accusations. Under these circum-
stances, the private person will most likely have no redress whatsoever.
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:.or is there any real protection in the hope of proving that the
defamatory statements did not involve a matter of public or general
concern. Once broadcast or in 'o^int it ,? ‘ l ’ x v/ould very difficult co
maintain that the contents of a defamation did not involve a matter
Of "public concern." Even if the matter is one of mere gossip or
curiosity, the task of distinguishing genuine public interest from
mere curiosity becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible.
having criticized, as inadequate and unfair, Brennan's solution,
which the Court seems prepared to adopt, I think it is appropriate to
offer an alternative approach which more equitably balances the compet-
ing interests involved. The solution which I propose is very simple.
As a supplement to the law of libel, the right of reply represents the
most direct and precise means of accommodating the protection of an
individual's reputation with the maintenance of a free press ." 2 If
d person erroneously defamed were guaranteed the right immediately
to respond to a defamatory publication about him, not only would he
be able to protect his own reputation, but, also, the public audience
would not be left with false information.
Gi course, as with any attempt legally to solve social conflicts,
tnere are many difficulties involved in the implementation of the right
of reply. The foremost, perhaps, is creating that right. The most
appropriate source from which the right of reply might emerge is a .
statute, either federal or state. But, presently, there is no federal
statute granting a right of reply; and, only a few states currently
supply the person defamed with that right.
However, the Court itself could supplement a constitutional right
of reply to the growing constitutional lav; of libel. Prior to New
~ ^
... iii.:Co
,
supreme Gour .. had. not made a single pronouncement on
the constitutional limits of libel law, except to state that libel was
not constitutionally protected speech. Since then, the Court has cur-
tailed the reach of state libel law by adding to the simple words of the
first amendment an extremely high standard of liability for certain
kinds of speech. Through judicial rulings, the consitutional law of
libel holds that a public official or a public figure in a libel case
must prove actual malice on the part of the critic or publisher who
defames him. As another judicial artifact, the Court could rule that
the press must allow those who are defamed the means to counter the
defamation made against them. In other words, as a prerequisite to a
successful defense, the press must provide the defamed with a chance to
counter the defamatory attack.
Unlike the Court's balancing of interests, the right of reply aims
directly at resolving the conflict between a free press and the protec-
tion of reputations. But it should be only a supplement to the law
of libel; by itself, it cannot provide an adequate solution to the
problem.
In Chapter I, I argued that a right of reply should complement the
Court's actual malice rule in cases involving alleged defamation of
public officials. That is, to deter deliberate lies, the actual malice
test ought to be retained in cases involving defamation of puolic offic-
ials. Thus, if a public official believes that he was deliberately
and falsely defamed, he should not only have the right of reply, but he
should also be able to initiate a' damage suit to "punish" the de^amer
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for deliberately lying.
Indeea, the right of reply together with the actual malice test, to
aecer delioerately false defamation, represents the best balance of in-
terests for all potential libel cases. That is, instead of attempting
to define "public official," "public figure," or "matter of public con-
cern," the constitutional lav; of libel would best accommodate the con-
flict of interests in all libel cases if the person defamed were assured
a right of reply and the irresponsible press were deterred from deliber-
~tely defaming individuals. An effective right of reply would guaran-
tee the iormer, and the actual malice test would be an effort to ensure
the latter. The actual malice standard is set high enough to safeguard
a free and responsible press.
3y itself, however, the actual malice test applied to all cases
would leave nelpless ana injured all those unable to attain access to
the press. In this sense, Justice Brennan's proposed solution, which
«ay e ventually become law, olindly and quite effectively would destroy
the ability to protect the reputations of private individuals—in fact,
the reputation of anyone without sufficient means to respond to defama-
tory charges.
Although I believe that the Court will eventually accept Brennan's
thesis as announced in Rosenbloom
,
there is nevertheless a hopeful hint
that Justice Brennan might endorse the right of reply as a supplement
to the developing constitutional law of libel. In Rosenbloom
,
Brennan
wrote: "[ilf the States fear that private citizens will not be able to
respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the
In-
direction of ensuring their ability to respond . . . ."
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